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1 Introduction
1.1 The economics of monitoring and enforcement
All kinds of human societies feature certain rules that aim to coordinate social
interactions and to guide and control human and organizational behavior. The
nature of these rules reach from unwritten and sometimes even unuttered implicit
social norms (like knocking on a door before entering a room) and mostly self-
enforcing legal prescriptions (e.g. the prohibition to smoke at gas stations) to
criminal law that prescribes small ﬁnes for some oﬀences but also dictates severe
sanctions for a number of felonies.
This thesis deals with legal regulations and laws instead of informal norms.
For laws and regulations to be eﬀective it must be ensured that at least a certain
minimum fraction of those adressed by them comply. In many circumstances,
however, actors can beneﬁt from violating. Such beneﬁts can take various forms,
e.g. saving time when speeding on the highway, making proﬁts from selling illegal
drugs or saving the costs to install pollution abatement equipment. The incentives
to violate raise the question what mechanisms society can implement to assure
full or at least partial compliance. At a ﬁrst glance, law enforcement appears to
be a topic covered primarily by legal scholars. However, economists have made
and are still making considerable contributions when laws are designed and help
to answer how they can be enforced eﬃciently.
Early economic reasoning applied to the subject of monitoring and enforce-
ment dates back to the eighteenth century (Montesquieu 1748, Beccaria 1764,
Bentham 1789). Nevertheless, it was Gary Becker's (1968) seminal theory of
'Crime and Punishment' that opened the door for modern economists to con-
tribute to answer questions about law enforcement. The theory is based on the
1
Figure 1.1: Examples of Monitoring and Enforcement Activities.
observation that a rational, risk-neutral actor commits an oﬀence if and only if
the beneﬁt from violating a law exceeds the expected penalty for doing so. The
latter is the product of, ﬁrst, the probability of detection and subsequent pun-
ishment and, second, the penalty imposed in case of a conviction. Therefore, the
expected penalty is jointly determined by two processes, namely monitoring and
enforcement. The monitoring process focusses on informational issues and covers
all those actions that contribute to identifying whether an oﬀence was commit-
ted and, if so, who the perpetrator is. Enforcement, instead, subsumes all those
sanctions that are imposed on an identiﬁed violator. In principle, monitoring
activities as well as enforcement actions can be undertaken by a public agency
or by private parties. Private agents can be diﬀerentiated according to whether
they are harmed by a violation or whether they are unaﬀected third parties (see
also ﬁgure 1.1 which includes some examples). The incentives to participate in
monitoring and enforcement typically diﬀer substantially in both situations.
Given that operating a proper monitoring system requires signiﬁcant resources,
e.g. the police, whereas imposing penalties is often less expensive1, Becker derives
the maximum punishment principle. This says that to obtain a certain level of
deterrence, i.e. a certain expected punishment, it is optimal to raise the penalty
up to its maximum and set the probability of punishment as small as possible as
long as it ensures the desired level of deterrence.2 A similar conclusion is that it is
often optimal to bear a positive level of crime: Full compliance requires that the
1This certainly holds for monetary ﬁnes that are mere transfers except some (often negligible)
transaction costs. Whether other types of punishment like imprisonment, incapacitation or even
the death penalty are less expensive is an empirical question.
2Garoupa (1997) reviews some of the arguments against optimality of maximal sanctions.
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expected penalty exceeds the highest beneﬁt any actor can obtain. Achieving this
highest level of deterrence might demand additional spendings on monitoring and
enforcement which exceed the additional social gains, e.g. the harm prevented,
from deterring the actors with the highest beneﬁts.
The tremendous literature following Becker modiﬁed, extended and also ques-
tioned the theory in several ways by taking diﬀerent important features into ac-
count. Among the most notable are the question whether more harmful acts
should be punished more severely (Stigler 1970, Mookherjee and Png 1992, 1994,
Wilde 1992, Shavell 1992, Friedman and Sjostrom 1993) and similar how to treat
attempts (Shavell 1990); the incorporation of errors in legal proceedings (Har-
ris 1970, Ehrlich 1982, Png 1986) and - related - of fairness concerns (Polinsky
and Shavell 2000a); the consideration of dynamic aspects or how to deal with
repeat oﬀenders (Landsberger and Meilijson 1982, Greenberg 1984, Davis 1988,
Harrington 1988, Polinsky and Rubinfeld 1991); and the analysis of nonmonetary
sanctions (Block and Lind 1975, Polinsky and Shavell 1984, Shavell 1985, 1987a,
1987b, Chu and Jiang 1993).3
Many of these extensions, however, remain within the traditional bilateral set-
ting. This considers, on the one hand, one or more (potential) perpetrators. On
the other hand, most models assume a single public agency that is responsible
for both monitoring activities and enforcement actions. However, many situa-
tions are characterized by a trilateral setting. Trilateral settings acknowledge
that in many monitoring and enforcement situations at least one third actor is
involved. Often such an additional actor can inﬂuence the standard monitoring
and enforcement process. According to the above diﬀerentiation (see again ﬁgure
1.1) such a third actor can either be a public authority or a private party. On
behalf of public authorities a third type of actor is formed if, for instance, two
distinct agencies are responsible for, ﬁrst, monitoring and, second, enforcement.4
Other situations arise if two public agencies both carry out monitoring or en-
forcement activities. One example is the distinction between public prosecutors
(also contributing to monitoring) and courts both being involved in enforcement.
3See also Polinsky and Shavell (2000b) for an overview of aspects of public enforcement and
Cohen (1999) and Heyes (2000) for surveys with a special focus on enforcement of environmental
regulations.
4Part III analyzes such a situation.
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Private actors can carry out monitoring and enforcement actions as well. At the
monitoring stage victims can but need not share their information with public
authorities (e.g. Garoupa 2001).5 A similar setting considers whistleblowers (e.g.
Miceli and Near 1992, Apesteguia et al. 2007), i.e. people not directly harmed
by violations but possessing insider information who are willing to report wrong-
ful conducts. Neighborhood watchprograms are local organizations undertaking
monitoring activities to prevent crimes in the vicinity of their homes (e.g. Rosen-
baum 1987, Garofalo and McLeod 1989, Skogan 1988, 1989). At the enforcement
stage harmed private parties can, for instance, claim on tort law (e.g. Epstein
1973, Rizzo 1980, Shavell 1980). Not directly harmed private parties can partic-
ipate in enforcement if, for instance, they are authorized to prosecute and arrest
violators in exchange for a reward (e.g. Becker and Stigler 1974, Landes and
Posner 1975, Polinsky 1980, Friedman 1984).
For various reasons it appears appealing to additionally rely on third actors
in monitoring and enforcement. Delegating monitoring and enforcement to two
distinct public agencies, for instance, can help to prevent agency capture or lead
to specialization beneﬁts.6 Another obvious example is the potential to save mon-
itoring expenditures if private parties report their - often superior - knowledge
about misconducts to public enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, optimally
integrating third parties into the process of monitoring and enforcement is of-
ten not a straightforward exercise. Public authorities can be bounded by legal
restrictions or can pursue own interest. On behalf of private parties it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that their incentives are rarely aligned with social interest.
Thus, given the signiﬁcant resources required for an eﬀective monitoring and en-
forcement system it is important to have a sound economic theory that helps to
understand whether and, if 'yes', how, integrating third actors can help to either
reduce the costs of or to make monitoring and enforcement more eﬀective. There-
fore, the purpose of this thesis is to extend the economic theory of monitoring
and enforcement within diﬀerent trilateral settings.
5See also Hylton (1996) who analyzes optimal law enforcement when potential victimes can
take precautionary eﬀort.
6See for example Hiriart et al. (2010).
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1.2 Research questions, methodology, and main
ﬁndings
This thesis analyzes three diﬀerent trilateral monitoring and enforcement situa-
tions. Parts I and II consider private monitoring - a topic that despite its practical
importance has attracted only few attention by economists. Part I analyzes re-
porting by agents that are not harmed by an oﬀence but who are willing to report
their observations to public authorities. The analysis in part II considers a spe-
cial monitoring technology employed by harmed third parties. Part III focusses
soley on public monitoring and enforcement. The analysis considers two public
authorities where one is supposed to add more strength to the enforcement stage.
1.2.1 Citizen reporting
Citizens reporting observations of misconducts is an important feature in mod-
ern monitoring and enforcement. Violations can be diﬀerentiated according to
the primary information source for public authorities becoming aware of crimes.
Typical cases where public monitoring is the most important source are drunken
driving and drug selling. For many violations, however, reporting by private
parties is essential. Fields of crime where public agencies naturally and almost
exclusively rely on citizen reporting include burglary, fraud, and rape. Oﬀences
where public monitoring as well as citizen reporting are signiﬁcant are violations
of product safety regulations, illegal waste disposals, and cartel arrangements. In
the U.S., for example, reporting is responsible for 40 percent of crimes known
to the police (U.S. DoJ 2003). Such ﬁgures raise the question how third party
reporting - a potentially low cost information source - can be harnessed more
widely for providing deterrence. Part I adresses this question with a special focus
on the design of legal rules.
For this purpose part I considers a harmful act but one that does not directly
harm others. Unaﬀected agents, say citizens recognizing only partial compliance
with product safety measures, are willing to incur the costs of reporting their
(exclusive) information to a public authority, if they provide a 'valuable' input in
5
doing so.7 The research question is how legal rules should be designed to encour-
age citizen reporting. Stated diﬀerently, part I asks how the presence of citizens,
i.e. a modiﬁcation at the monitoring stage, motivated to share their potentially
valuable information, in turn, aﬀects decisions at the stage of deﬁning certain
acts to be illegal. To answer this question part I develops a game theoretic model
that features three types of players: potential perpetrators, unaﬀected citizens,
and a regulator. The game is characterized by two asymmetric information struc-
tures. First, the regulator knows a perpetrator's beneﬁt from committing the act
under consideration but citizens do not. Second, citizens observe whether an act
was committed but the regulator would have to undertake costly inspections to
obtain that information. The main contribution of the model is that it uncovers
a potential additional beneﬁt of uniform regulations, i.e. regulations that ban an
activity for anyone independent of whether individual private beneﬁts are greater
or smaller than social harm. Contrary to tailored standards that account for pri-
vate beneﬁts a uniform regulation renders citizens' informational shortcomings
irrelevant for the reporting decision. Moreover, it provides a novel argument why
it can be optimal to bear a positive level of misconducts. Whether it is desirable
to impose a uniform ban depends, among other things, on the distribution and
levels of private beneﬁts and on the diﬀerent cost parameters.
1.2.2 Citizen monitoring
The analysis in part I assumes that citizens perfectly observe previous actions.
In many situations, however, it is only possible to receive imperfect signals about
other agents' behavior. Part II analyzes some of the consequences of improving
such a signal's accuracy. The motivating examples are private initiatives like
'water keepers' and 'bucket brigades'. Both are non-governmental organizations
whose aim is to contribute to increased environmental quality. The former focus
on water quality whereas the latter focus on air quality. Among other activities,
such initiatives frequently take samples of the medium of interest and undertake
rudimentary analyses to determine pollution intensities. In case of a signiﬁcant
7Part I discusses in detail potential motivations of unaﬀected citizens to report their obser-
vations and thus when they consider their contribution to be 'valuable'.
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ﬁnding they inform public authorities. Such private initiatives are a still small
but growing phenomenon. Bucket brigades by now spread all over the world8
and the EPA's National Directory of Volunteer Monitoring Programs currently
lists roughly 900 organizations in the U.S. that monitor and assess water quality.9
The imperfection of monitoring devices employed by such initiatives raises the
question whether it is beneﬁcial to improve the accuracy of those techniques.
The analysis in part II asks how the use of a better sampling technology
- characterized by fewer false negative results - aﬀects public monitoring and
enforcement. Although similar in nature to the model in part I the game theoretic
model of part II diﬀers in various aspects. First, private monitoring initiatives
are assumed to be harmed by pollution, e.g. because of direct health eﬀects
or indirectly through depreciation of the value of their homes.10 Second, the
regulator now does not decide whether a ﬁrm is allowed to pollute11. Instead, he
soley decides whether to investigate reports and whether to monitor in the absence
of a report. The analysis in part II reveals that implementing a better monitoring
device can be accompanied by less compliance, more pollution, and lower welfare
due to crowding eﬀects. In that case better private monitoring crowds in public
enforcement but crowds out public monitoring. Part II shows that whether a
better monitoring technology leads to less pollution mainly depends on the error
probability itself.
1.2.3 Regulatory monitoring and prosecutorial enforcement
Contrary to the ﬁrst two parts, part III does not consider private actors but fo-
cuses on the interaction of public monitoring and enforcement and is motivated by
recent policy initiatives. Regulation of environmentally harmful activities is often
delegated to administrative agencies who can impose administrative sanctions on
8See for example http://www.gcmonitor.org; last check on February 13th 2011.
9Source: http://yosemite.epa.gov/water/volmon.nsf/Home?openform;
Last check on February 13th 2011.
10Nevertheless, the results in part II carry over to the case of unaﬀected members of such
initiatives as long as they are motivated to monitor. Such a motivation could be intrinsic or
extrinsic, e.g. they are paid a reward in case they ﬁnd a violation.
11Actually, the model assumes that the harm caused by pollution is suﬃciently large so that
it is never optimal to allow pollution from a welfare perspective .
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violators. One potential shortcoming of administrative sanctions is that they are
often limited in size. This gave rise to an increased demand to deem violations
of certain environmental regulations as criminal oﬀences. At the European level
this resulted in the EU directive 2008/99/EC which prescribes member states to
enact an environmental criminal law to harness the strength of harsher sanction-
ing in order to increase deterrence. Criminalizing certain oﬀences, however, adds
a third type of actor to law enforcement, namely public prosecutors. Part III an-
alyzes two eﬀects of this course of action. On the one hand, prosecutors (together
with courts) are able to impose higher sanctions. On the other hand, they operate
within a speciﬁc legal environment. One consequence is that criminal sanctioning
does not necessarily consider its implications on ﬁrms' incentives to self-report
violations. The phenomenon of self-reporting violations, however, is a substantial
and valuable element of modern environmental regulation. The analysis in part
III asks under which conditions the eﬀect of higher deterrence is dominated by the
potentially adverse eﬀect of diluted self-reporting incentives. The principal-agent
model shows the conditions under which criminalizing environmental oﬀences has
a negative impact on environmental quality.
Taken together, this thesis shows that it is important to acknowledge the
presence of third parties in understanding and designing the monitoring and en-
forcement process. It demonstrates that integrating these actors into the process
has the potential to improve on the outcomes. However, it also shows that doing
so is not for free but brings about previously overlooked types of cost and can
- if not properly assessed - even be counterproductive and make things worse.
Thus, this thesis shows that a careful evaluation of the consequences of mobiliz-
ing third parties for the monitoring and enforcement process is inevitable before
advocating on superiority of trilateral settings.
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Part I
Monitoring and Enforcement: The
L.B. Jeﬀeries Problem
9
2 Introduction to part I
From traﬃc rules to penal law, many of the regulations that restrict the actions
of individuals or ﬁrms impose uniform rules. In a heterogeneous population, such
uniformity leads to considerable diﬀerences in the marginal cost of compliance.
As a result, aggregate compliance costs will be high.
Explanations for the predominance of uniform rules frequently invoke argu-
ments of equity and fairness in order to justify high aggregate compliance costs.
But would uniform rules also be chosen by a policy-maker exclusively interested
in eﬃciency? The answer to this question requires not only an assessment of
the costs of uniform standards, but also of the possible beneﬁts that uniform
standards provide.1 The economic literature has identiﬁed at least two types of
beneﬁts policy-makers can realize by imposing uniform standards: The ﬁrst type
are the signiﬁcant coordination beneﬁts (Schelling 1978) that can arise from align-
ing mutual expectations about others' behavior, such as in the case of traﬃc rules
(Lave 1985). The second type of beneﬁts arise at the stage of regulatory design.
Landes and Posner (1987), for instance, demonstrate in a tort law context that
the 'reasonable person standard' is a response to the considerable resources that
would have to be invested in order to design individualized standards. The infor-
mation costs involved will commonly outweigh the eﬃciency gains from setting
individualized negligence standards.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that there is a third distinct type
of beneﬁts from uniformity in regulation that arise at the monitoring and en-
1Of course, uniform rules can be corner solutions to the problem of optimal regulation,
rendering variations in compliance cost immaterial for rule design. Severe felonies for which no
level of welfare gain by the perpetrator outweighs the harm of the crime are a typical example
(Posner 1985, Shavell 1993). Focussing on the interesting case this paper considers only those
cases where at least for some perpetrators the private beneﬁts exceed the harm caused.
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forcement stage. As a speciﬁc illustration of these beneﬁts, we show in this paper
that uniform regulations are an attractive solution to what the paper terms the
'L.B. Jeﬀeries problem'. Referring to the pivotal character in Hitchcock's (1954)
ﬁctional account of bystanders solving a crime,2 the problem encapsulates the
question of how to make members of the public that are willing and able to report
violations to the regulator at a cost to themselves productive for law enforcement.
Evidence for the ability and willingness to report is strong, even when those who
report are not themselves directly aﬀected by the violation. Roughly two thirds
of crimes in the U.S. have a non-complicit third party present, and reports by
third parties bring an additional 230,000 cases to the attention of the police every
year (U.S. DoJ 2002). As a whole, reports by third parties are responsible for 40
percent of crimes known to the police (U.S. DoJ 2003). Third-party participation
in enforcement is not only evident in the ﬁeld (see also Kahneman et al. 1986),
but also an empirical regularity in laboratory experiments (Turillo et al. 2002,
Fehr and Fischbacher 2004, Carpenter and Matthews 2005). Theoretically, Ben-
dor and Mookherjee (1990) show that third-party sanctioning can be part of an
equilibrium in an inﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma because it can enhance
cooperation. From an evolutionary point of view, there is additional evidence
that a biological predisposition for third-party punishment can confer evolution-
ary advantages to groups, and that the share of third-party punishers increases
in the size of the society (Marlowe et al. 2008).
Legal scholars have debated diﬀerent instruments for enhancing reporting of
observed violations by non-aﬀfected third parties (Bickman and Helwig 1979,
Wenik 1985, Kraakman 1986, Grabosky 1992, and Gilboy 1998). One of the
paper's insights is to show that one of the most meaningful instruments, unifor-
mity of rules, may already be in place. In the context of public law enforcement,
making rules uniform is productive because it can enable the regulator to reduce
monitoring costs by better harnessing citizens' willingness to supply information
and thus substitute for own costly monitoring.3 Regulators that account for the
2L.B. Jeﬀeries, the main character in 'Rear Window' (1954) is a successful, but temporarily
wheelchair-bound photographer who voyeuristically watches his neighbors from the back window
of his apartment.
3Cornell Woolrich's plot of 'Rear Window' requires that L.B.Jeﬀeries' monitoring technology
is imperfect. The question of technology is the subject of part II.
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heterogeneity of compliance costs by individualizing rules do not realize the ben-
eﬁts of such a substitution.
The core of the paper consists of a parsimonious model for capturing the L.B.
Jeﬀeries problem and for deriving the conditions under which a regulator would
choose a system of uniform rules rather than one that is individualized, i.e. tai-
lored to the individual circumstances of the potential oﬀender. Our results are
derived in a sequential game setting4 involving three parties: One are a large
number of heterogeneous agents that can proﬁtably engage in a socially harmful
activity, but may violate a rule by doing so. The second party are equally numer-
ous citizens within the population that individually observe one of the agents'
action and that are motivated to incur the cost of reporting to the regulator
those activities that they expect to be punished. The third party is the regulator
that commits to and announces either a uniform rule that treats all agents in the
same way or individualized rules that take into account the heterogeneity among
agents. The regulator can also choose the volume of (costly) inspections in order
to inﬂuence compliance, the share of citizens' reports that are investigated at a
cost, and the ﬁne for noncompliance. The regulator knows the agents' types, but
not their actions while the citizen knows the observed agent's action, but not
his type. The three-party setting thus captures salient informational imperfec-
tions that are part and parcel of public law enforcement and allows weighing the
savings in monitoring costs against enforcement and compliance costs.
Comparing the choice of uniform and individualized rules, the paper's contri-
bution is to show that uniform rules provide a type of beneﬁt that may have been
implicitly understood, but that has not been formally analyzed and acknowledged.
Since reporting is costly, citizens do not report acts that they believe will not or
cannot be punished. A regulator that can credibly commit to treating everyone
the same, regardless of the merits of their actions, makes reporting worthwhile
to a motivated public, which - in turn - provides eﬀective deterrence against that
fraction of oﬀenders that the regulator would otherwise need to monitor at his
own expense. The cost of uniformity lies in having to either punish those oﬀend-
ers that the regulator - in an ideal world - would allow committing the act or to
4Earlier works that model the regulatory process in a game theoretic way include Russell
(1990) and Avenhaus (1992).
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deter those same individuals. The latter type of cost leads to high aggregate com-
pliance costs whereas the former type materializes in investigation costs that the
regulator has to incur to keep citizens motivated to report infractions. Whether
or not the regulator can improve on the uniform policy by individualizing rules
depends on the cost structure. Under individualized rules, the regulator needs to
rely on his own monitoring because exploiting citizens' reports is 'self-defeating':
What would remain in equilibrium in that case is a situation of only those agents
committing the act that are allowed to, which renders reporting not a best re-
sponse for citizens. Monitoring costs therefore push the regulator away from
individualized rules. This point can be made stark in the form of a pure-strategy
equilibrium in which a sharp tradeoﬀ arises between economizing on monitoring
costs and rule-setting: Some of those agents whom society would ideally like to
remain unconstrained have to be sacriﬁced in order for the target share of agents
to comply with the law. In extremis, eﬃciency may dictate to make the 'good
guys' do bad to make the 'bad guys' do good.
The approach of this paper relates to the existing literature in several ways.
It is closely related to the theme of information costs facing regulators (Landes
and Posner 1985, Laﬀont and Tirole 1993, Polinsky and Shavell 2000b). While
sharing the fundamental concern about how to overcome informational imperfec-
tions, the present model deviates from this strand both in terms of the peculiar
information structure across the three parties and the non-contractibility of infor-
mation provision by citizens. Shavell (1993) considers - among other things - how
to incentivize the sharing of information by third parties with enforcement agen-
cies, but does not consider the interplay between standard setting and reporting.
Arguedas and Rousseau (2009) analyze how regulatory monitoring strategies can
lead to eﬃcient outcomes in case of uniform standards but do not incorporate
third party monitoring. Other authors within this literature are concerned about
the internal organization of law enforcement. Boyer et al. (2000), for instance,
study a setting where law enforcers need to be incentivized to pursue violators.
While there are some parallels, we diﬀer both in terms of the nature and re-
lationship of our parties and the research question that motivates the inquiry.
A second literature that this paper speaks to concerns regulatory policies that
make agents self-report (Kaplow and Shavell 1994) or someone with incongruent
13
interests within the agent's organization 'blow the whistle' (Heyes and Kapur
2009a) and thus disclose the hidden action to the regulator on their own. An-
other literature studies to what extent a small number of agents in an industry
can be made to monitor and report on each other (Stiglitz 1990, Varian 1990). In
contrast to these papers, our model focuses - in a setting with numerous agents
and citizens - on third parties outside the agent's organization and thus on a
competing technology for reducing monitoring costs. Finally, the third literature
to which this paper relates examines the private enforcement of law (Landes and
Posner 1975). In the present paper, the public is also involved, but at a diﬀerent
stage. In common with actual practice, control over enforcement remains with
the regulator. Instead, members of the public participate at the monitoring stage
only, with the beneﬁts of doing so conditional on regulator action.
The structure of this part is as follows: The following section introduces the
set-up of the core model. Section 4 develops the key propositions, followed by a
discussion in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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3 The model of part I
The core model features three types of players: a regulator, agents that beneﬁt
from committing socially harmful acts, and citizens that are motivated to report
illegal behavior to the regulator. The regulatory setting will combine hidden in-
formation (the agents' type), hidden action (the agents' action), and constrained
communication in a way that makes the L.B. Jeﬀeries problem salient: The reg-
ulator in the model knows the agent's type, but not whether he committed the
act. This gives rise to hidden action. The citizen observes whether the act has
been committed, but does not know the agents' type, thus leading to hidden
information. The relationship between the citizens and the regulator is one of
noncontractibility and constrained communication: Citizens can report to the
regulator that an act has been committed, but cannot be contracted to do so.
On the other hand, the regulator cannot inform citizens about the agent's type
prior to them reporting. This implies a focus on the interesting situations in
which the regulator cannot simply 'tag' types.1 These modelling choices capture
the essence of an enforcement system with heterogeneous agents, motivated, but
imperfectly informed citizens, and a constrained regulator. In this setting, the
regulator's problem is to choose between individualized rules and uniform rules,
and then to enforce those rules such as to maximize the net beneﬁts of regula-
tion, i.e. the diﬀerence of private gains incurred by the agents minus harm and
enforcement costs.
Two purposes guide the choice of the setting. One is to exclude previously
analyzed beneﬁts that can make uniform rules preferable over individualized reg-
ulations: Coordination beneﬁts are ruled out by eliminating interaction between
1Technologies that force the agent to reveal his type exist in some circumstances (e.g. prison
uniforms). For such technologies to be employed, however, requires that they are (i) available,
(ii) relatively cheap and (iii) desirable despite their stigmatizing eﬀect.
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regulated agents. Moreover, information costs due to hidden information are neu-
tralized by considering a regulator that knows each agent's type. Therefore, if
the regulator imposes a uniform rule, other types of beneﬁts must account for
the optimality of treating every agent the same. The second purpose is to model
a tractable setting that puts the issues into sharp relief. Taken together, the
modeling choice and stark simpliﬁcations allow scrutinizing the issue of private
involvement directly and in isolation, but also provide clear points of departure
for future extensions.
3.1 Players and actions
This section speciﬁes the players' available actions. These, the timing of the game
and the information sets are also depicted in ﬁgure 3.1.
Agents decide whether to commit the act under consideration. Committing
the act leads to external social harm h and generates private gross beneﬁts for
the agent. For example, the agent could be thought of as a ﬁrm that considers
dumping waste rather than using proper disposal channels. The population of n
agents, with n large, consists of two types of agents, one obtaining beneﬁts θL, the
other obtaining θH , with θL < θH . To make the regulatory choice stark, assume
initially that θL < h < θH so that it is socially advantageous that high, but not
low types commit the act. The distribution of types is common knowledge, i.e.
all players know the shares of nL
n
(nH
n
) of low (high) types. The choice of an agent
is denoted ai, i ∈ {L,H}, with
ai =
{
1
0
if an agent of type i commits the act
else
. (I.1)
Agents have identical ﬁnite wealth w with θH ≤ w <∞.
The regulator chooses the regulatory policies that apply to the agents. To
the regulator, not only the distribution, but the individual type of each agent are
known from the outset. The regulatory policies consist of three components: The
ﬁrst is a binary standard that either allows or prohibits the agent from carrying
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out the action. Denote the standard aˆi, i ∈ {L,H}, with
aˆi =
{
1
0
if the act is allowed for an agent of type i
else
. (I.2)
Given (I.1) and (I.2) an agent violates the norm if ai > aˆi or ai (1− aˆi) = 1.
The second component is the monitoring strategy, conditional on reports: If
no citizen reports a violation by an agent, the regulator commits to inspect that
agent with probability pi. Inspection costs are cIns and truthfully reveal the action
ai. If there is a report, the regulator investigates the report with probability qi.
Investigation costs are cInv and also truthfully reveal ai.
The third component is the enforcement strategy: If inspections detect or
investigations conﬁrm a violation, the regulator chooses a ﬁne Fi subject to Fi ≤ w
so that ﬁnes can provide eﬀective deterrence (Shavell 1986). The regulatory policy
for an agent of type i is summarized by the tuple {aˆi, pi, qi, Fi}i.2
The focus of the paper is on the regulator's choice on whether to apply the
regulations in an identical way to all agents (uniform rules) or to determine
the speciﬁc setting of the regulations for each agent individually (individualized
rules). In the two-type setting explored here, individualized rules mean diﬀer-
ent standards for low and high types or, formally, regulatory policies of types
({1, pL, qL, FL}L , {0, pH , qH , FH}H) or ({0, pL, qL, FL}L , {1, pH , qH , FH}H). Un-
der uniform regulations both types face the same standard, the same monitor-
ing and the same enforcement strategy3: The regulatory policy is {0, p, q, F} or
{1, p, q, F}4 for all agents. The regulator then announces these policies publicly.
Citizens are the third type of players. The risk-neutral and identical citizens
can be thought of as clones of L.B. Jeﬀeries within the population: Members of
the general public watching their personal environment as they go about their
2Restricting the regulator to a ﬁxed ﬁne of an amount suﬃcient to provide full deterrence
provides an alternative modelling strategy. This common assumption, however, deprives the
analysis of a subtlety: As we show below, there exists an equilibrium in which the ﬁne must
also be suﬃciently small to ensure non-compliance.
3We relax the assumption that uniform standards have to be accompanied by uniform mon-
itoring and enforcement choices in section 4.3.
4For simplicity we omit the subscript if a policy is uniform and set it into brackets if an
expression applies to both individualized and uniform policies.
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daily lives. In order to collapse what is a dynamic process of observing and
detecting into a static setting, we consider as a benchmark the stylized case of n
citizens being randomly matched one-to-one with n agents at the time when the
agent commits the act or not. Citizens observe ai at zero cost. However, due to
random matching, the citizen does not know the type i of the agent whose act he
observes.
The randomized one-to-one mapping between citizens and agents purposefully
abstracts from citizens purposefully gathering information across several agents.
It also precludes free-riding because every agent's decision is observed by only
one citizen.5 Further, citizens are endowed with a perfect monitoring technology,
i.e. every citizen identiﬁes exactly whether 'his' agent has committed the act.
The decision of a citizen whether to report is denoted r with
r =
{
1
0
if the citizen reports
else
.
Being risk-neutral, a citizen will ﬁle a report about an incidence if and only if
the expected beneﬁts are at least as great as the costs of reporting, to which we
turn now.
The literature suggests diﬀerent reasons why reporting crimes is costly. The
two most obvious ones are the expense and time of ﬁling a report with a regulator,
e.g. the police. Many jurisdictions require this to be done in person and following
a certain protocol, thus raising costs. There are also information costs involved in
determining the correct regulator to approach with a report (police, FDA, EPA,
etc.). Finally, if the report results in enforcement actions, a citizen may have to
spend additional time in court as a witness. Other reasons cited in the literature
are fear of self-incrimination (Garoupa 2001) and fear of reprisals (Singer 1988,
Walker et al. 2009). The parameter cR subsumes these costs into a single measure.
There are three main explanations for the immaterial beneﬁts of reporting.
5See Harrington, Jr. (2001) and Osborne (2009, pages 131-132) for simple games where
more than one person can help a victim or report an observed crime to the police. They show
that the probability that no one helps (reports) increases in group size. See also Latané and
Nida (1981) for a review on this issue.
A related question is whether to impose a duty to rescue. Harnay and Marciano (2009)
provide a non exhaustive review of analyses of rescue laws.
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One is that it generates beneﬁts to those reporting by helping prevent harm to
others and themselves (Shavell 1993). A second explanation are the psychological
rewards of contributing to the punishment of wrongdoers, a motive often labeled
as 'retribution' or 'thirst for revenge' (Wittman 1974, Posner 1980, Shavell 1993).
Thirdly, Posner (1980) and Heyes and Kapur (2009a) point out that individuals
feel a 'moral duty' to report crimes. All three aspects are borne out in the ﬁeld
and in the lab. Survey evidence (U.S. DoJ 2008) among citizens reporting crime
ﬁnds an overwhelming presence of the harm prevention argument (53.2 percent),
strong evidence for a moral duty to report (22.1 percent), and clear evidence
for a retribution motive (6.5 percent). Laboratory experiments on third-party
punishment corroborate these ﬁndings: Individuals that can observe, but are not
directly aﬀected by wrongful acts have a signiﬁcant willingness to pay for ensuring
that oﬀenders are sanctioned (Turillo et al. 2002, Fehr and Fischbacher 2004,
Carpenter and Matthews 2005). The immaterial beneﬁts B from reporting a
violation that will be punished with certainty are summarized by the parameter
b. For motivated citizens to be productive in monitoring requires that - at a
minimum - those unconditional beneﬁts of reporting exceed the cost of doing so,
i.e. b ≥ cR. Modeled in this way, citizens are "norm-takers" in the sense that the
beneﬁts of reporting are not conditional on the agent's type. Welfare-oriented
citizens, on the other hand, may well want to restrict reporting to those agents
that impose a net harm on society (i.e. low types) such that beneﬁts are now
conditioned on type, e.g. B (θL) = b whereas B (θH) ≤ 0. We initially retain the
norm-taker assumption, which gives rise to richer characterization of equilibria,
before demonstrating in section 4.3 that the equilibrium with welfare-oriented
citizens follows from these results in a natural way.
The harm prevention and retribution motives of citizens, on which this paper
builds, render the beneﬁts of reporting conditional on the subsequent behavior
of the regulator. The most salient dimension of regulator response is whether
further enforcement action is undertaken. Such enforcement might be withheld
because the act that was reported turns out to be not illegal upon investigation or
because the regulator fails to follow up on a report. The likelihood of subsequent
enforcement after reporting therefore matters for the reporter's beneﬁt. Theory
(Heyes and Kapur 2009a, Mokherjee and Png 1992), experiments (van Soest and
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Vyrastekova 2009), and empirical evidence (MacDonald 2001) highlight that a
decrease in the perceived likelihood of subsequent enforcement action is associated
with a reduction in the incentives to report. This is underlined by survey evidence
on reporting behavior in both the US (U.S. DoJ 2008) and the UK (Walker et
al. 2009): Uncertainty over whether a person's act did or did not constitute an
oﬀence and over subsequent police eﬀorts are cited as an important reason for not
reporting. Other studies show that the propensity to report criminal activities to
the police depends on the size (Levitt 1998) and the productivity (Soares 2004)
of enforcement institutions, but less so on external pecuniary rewards (Bickman
and Helwik 1979).
Taken together, the motivated citizens in this model take their decision on
whether or not to report on the basis of unconditional costs and conditional
beneﬁts. We now turn to the objectives and payoﬀs of the citizens and the other
two players that determine that decision before explaining the timing of decisions.
3.2 Objectives and payoﬀs
The players' objectives and the strategic interaction between players determine
their payoﬀs and therefore the optimal choice among the options for action set
out above.
Agents maximize expected net beneﬁts from committing the act. Given the
citizen's choice and the regulatory policy, expected net beneﬁts for an agent of
type i are
pii = ai
[
θi −
(
1− aˆ(i)
) (
rq(i)F(i) + (1− r) p(i)F(i)
)]
.
If an agent commits the act (ai = 1) he receives gross beneﬁts θi. If ai = 1 and the
act is not allowed (1− â(i) = 1) an agent has to pay the ﬁne F(i) either when being
inspected with probability p(i) if his act is not reported (1− r = 1) or when being
investigated with probability q(i) if he gets reported (r = 1). Since θi > 0, if the
act is allowed (â(i) = 1) or in the absence of enforcement (rq(i) + (1− r) p(i) = 0),
an agent will always choose ai = 1.
The regulator's mandate is to maximize the value of his policy V , which is
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the diﬀerence between the net beneﬁts of regulation and its enforcement costs
for each agent Vi, aggregated over all n = nH + nL agents. Policies are at most
diﬀerentiated by type: Agents of the same type face the same regulatory policy.
Given a type i agent's decision and citizens' reporting choices, the contribution
Vi of one agent of type i to V is
Vi = ai (θi − h)− rq(i)cInv − (1− r) p(i)cIns.
If the act is committed, Vi comprises the private gross beneﬁts to the agent and
harm to the public. In case of a report the regulator incurs investigation costs with
probability q(i), otherwise he bears the expected inspection costs. Since citizens
are identical, the optimal ai is the same for all agents of type i. In aggregating,
therefore, the regulator's criterion V becomes the sum of the diﬀerences by type,
weighted by the respective population:
V =
∑
i=L,H
niVi.
As in practice, net beneﬁts of reporting at the level of the citizen are not part
of the regulator's mandate (Heyes and Kapur 2009a). Given V , the regulator
needs to choose between a uniform policy that treats both types the same or an
individualized policy.
A citizen observing an action ai receives net utility from reporting b − cR
whenever he reports an illegal act that is subsequently investigated. A report on
a legal act leads only to costs for a citizen. Thus, utility u for citizens is
u = r
[
ai
(
1− aˆ(i)
)
q(i)b− cR
]
.
The tie-breaking rule adopted is that in case of indiﬀerence a citizen reports,
an agent complies with a ban and the regulator allows commmitting the act.
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3.3 Timing
The most intuitive depiction of the game tree for the regulator's problem of setting
uniform or individualized policies across n agents is to draw the tree from a single
citizen's point of view. Figure 3.1 shows that tree. The tree captures one of n
subproblems that yields a value VL (VH) if nature chose a low (high) type. The
regulator's problem is to maximize the value of his policy across all n subproblems
by deciding on a policy that conditions on the type chosen by nature or treats all
types the same.
From a citizen's point of view, the game starts with nature randomly assigning
an agent to every citizen. For the citizen, the only payoﬀ relevant question is the
type of agent that nature matched him with. As he has no information about
any agents' type, the relevant probability of facing a low (high) type is nL
n
(nH
n
).6
Second, the regulator - knowing each agent's type, but not the random assign-
ment - speciﬁes the regulatory policies for all agents simultaneously. The policies
are announced and become public knowledge.
Third, observing their type and the regulator's decision, agents choose whether
to commit the act. Finally, citizens decide whether to report. A citizen knows
whether the agent assigned to him committed the act and the regulatory policy.
The only thing a citizen does not know is of which type i the agent is. This
information structure is mirrored in the notation of the citizen's information sets:
An information set is denoted H aˆ0,1 after a uniform policy and H
aˆL,aˆH
0,1 after an
individualized one where the subscript is one if the citizen observes an act and
is zero otherwise. Not explicitly shown is the precommitted enforcement by the
regulator to ﬁnding ﬁrms non-compliant either by investigation following a report
or through a random inspection.
6This is, naturally, not true at the aggregate level: With ni > 0 for both i = {L,H} ,the
diﬀerent assignments of types to citizens are not independent at the aggregate level.
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4 Results
Having laid out the components of the game we now derive the solution to the
sequential game. The equilibrium concept employed here is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies, with no restrictions on beliefs oﬀ the equi-
librium path. As we consider only pure strategies deriving the respective systems
of beliefs is straightforward and arises naturally in what follows. We focus on
pure strategy equilibria at the expense of mixed strategies to derive the starkest
results.
4.1 Citizens' and agents' equilibrium choices
Starting at the last decision stage of the game, the citizen decides whether to
report. The citizen knows the agent's decision ai and the regulatory policy but
not the type of the agent he faces. As ai is a binary variable and the regulator
can choose between four diﬀerent kinds of policies the game can reach eight
information sets. At four of these sets the citizen observes that the act was not
committed and sequential rationality requires no report because cR > 0. Thus,
in a PBE the citizen's play at information sets H00 , H
1
0 , H
0,1
0 and H
1,0
0 is r = 0. At
the other four information sets the citizen knows that the act was committed. If
additionally the regulator set a uniform policy the optimal choice is unambiguous:
At H11 , i.e. the act is allowed for all agents, not to report is optimal, so the
equilibrium play is (r = 0 if H11 ). If instead the act is uniformly banned, i.e. the
game reached H01 , the payoﬀ from reporting is qb − cR compared to zero from
not reporting, thus in equilibrium the citizen plays
(
r = 0 if H01 , q <
cR
b
)
and(
r = 1 if H01 , q ≥ cRb
)
. Contrary, at the two remaining information sets where
ai = 1 and the regulator imposed individualized policies, the citizen's pay-oﬀ
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does not only depend on ai and the policy chosen but also also on the - unknown
- agents' type and thus on the node reached. If aˆi = 0 the pay-oﬀ from reporting
would be qib− cR whereas if aˆi = 1 the citizen only incurred the costs cR without
realizing beneﬁts. The equilibrium actions at H1,01 and H
0,1
1 therefore depend on
the agents' and the regulator's equilibrium strategies.
At the penultimate stage the agent who knows his type and the regulatory
policy decides whether to commit the act. The act can be allowed or banned. If it
is allowed the agent will commit the act because θi > 0. Therefore, in equilibrium
an agent plays ai = 1 if
{
1, p(i), q(i), F(i)
}
(i)
. Whether an agent complies with a ban
depends on the citizen's strategy and the regulator's monitoring and enforcement
strategy. He complies with a ban whenever committing the act yields a negative
pay-oﬀ. The ban can either be uniform or part of an individualized policy. Under
a uniform ban the agent's equilibrium play is unambiguous because the citizen's
equilibrium play following a uniform policy is also unambiguous. In equilibrium a
type i agent's play is (ai = 0 (= 1) if
{
0, p, q < cR
b
, F
}
, p, F s.t. θi−pF ≤ 0 (> 0))
and (ai = 0 (= 1) if
{
0, p, q ≥ cR
b
, F
}
, q, F s.t. θi − qF ≤ 0 (> 0)). Contrary, if
the ban is part of an individualized policy, an agent's equilibrium strategy also
depends on that of the citizen and is
(ai = 0 (= 1) if {0, pi, qi, Fi}i , pi, Fi s.t. θi − piFi ≤ 0 (> 0))
if the citizen plays
(
r = 0 if H
aˆi=0,aˆ−i=1
1
)
and
(ai = 0 (= 1) if {0, pi, qi, Fi}i , qi, Fi s.t. θi − qiFi ≤ 0 (> 0))
if
(
r = 1 if H
aˆi=0,aˆ−i=1
1
)
.
Having analyzed choices at the last two decision stages we can now turn to
the key part of the paper which characterizes the regulator's choice of policy at
the ﬁrst stage.
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4.2 Equilibrium policies
Based on the characterizations of citizens' and agents' behavior, we can now
derive proposition I.1 that deﬁnes the optimal regulatory policy. To identify the
optimal policy we apply a heuristic strategy that distinguishes between policies
that lead to identical or diﬀerent behavior by agents of diﬀerent types. We derive
the regulator's payoﬀ for every possible equilibrium policy and then compare
these outcomes to determine the optimal policy.
4.2.1 Policies that induce identical behavior
As a start we consider policies that induce identical behavior by all agents. The
two equilbrium policies possible are a uniform permit and a uniform ban with
full enforcement. If the regulator uniformly permits the act both types commit
it. Because citizens then do not report and no ﬁnes are imposed, the investiga-
tion probability and the ﬁne do not aﬀect any player's payoﬀ and are therefore
arbitrary. The inspection probability aﬀects V negatively and is thus set equal
to zero. As a result a uniform permit yields
V ({1, 0, q, F}) = nH (θH − h)− nL (h− θL) . (I.3)
One implication of (I.3) is that in the absence of a uniform permit p, q and F
must be set such that at least one type does not commit the act: If both types
commit the act the regulator's pay-oﬀ is
V =
∑
i=L,H
ni
(
θi − h− rq(i)cInv − (1− r) p(i)cIns
)
which is maximized for p(i) = 0 (if r = 0) and q(i) = 0 (if r = 1). But the
outcome is then the same as in (I.3) and by assumption the regulator then allows
the act. As a consequence, in equilibrium an individualized policy does not induce
identical behavior by all agents.1
The other policy inducing identical behavior is the fully enforced uniform ban.
1Naturally, as an individualized policy has aˆi = 1 for one type and ai = 1 is then the optimal
choice, an individualized policy also cannot induce ai = 0 for both types.
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This policy yields V = 0 as the lower bound for the regulator's equilibrium pay-
oﬀ: The regulator can ensure a non-negative outcome by enforcing a uniform
ban at no costs. A suﬃciently high investigation probability together with a
suﬃciently high ﬁne, e.g. q = 1 and F = w, guarantee compliance by both types.
A violation would be reported and the agent would get the negative pay-oﬀ θi−w.
As all agents comply, there are no reports and thus no investigations. Regulatory
inspections would only lead to costs because deterrence is provided by the threat
of a report. The optimal inspection probability is thus zero and the regulator
realizes
V ({0, 0, 1, w}) = 0. (I.4)
A consequence of (I.4) is
Lemma I.1 A policy inducing aL = 1 and aH = 0 is not a possible equilibrium
outcome.
Proof. An individualized policy inducing aH = 0 must have aˆH = 0 and aˆL = 1.
The regulator's payoﬀ then is
V ({1, pL, qL, FL}L , {0, pH , qH , FH}H) =
−nL (h− θL + rqLcInv + (1− r) pLcIns)− nHpHcIns.
Similar, a uniform policy inducing aˆH = 0 must have aˆ = 0 yielding
V ({0, p, q, F}) = −nL (h− θL + rqcInv + (1− r) pcIns)− nHpcIns.
Because h − θL > 0 both expressions are negative, but (I.4) shows that the
minimum equilibrium payoﬀ for the regulator is zero.
4.2.2 Policies that induce diﬀerent behavior
So far, we considered policies that induce identical behavior by all agents. The
lemma that follows from the fully enforced uniform ban directly applies to the
analysis of policies that induce diﬀerent behavior and is the basis for the following
analysis. It demonstrates that we can focus our attention on policies inducing
aL = 0 and aH = 1.
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To induce diﬀerent behavior the regulator can choose an individualized policy
or enforce a uniform ban only partially. Consider ﬁrst the case of an individualized
policy. The lemma shows that an individualized policy with aˆL = 1 and aˆH = 0
is not a possible equilibrium choice as it yields aL = 1. Therefore, the equilibrium
play cannot reach the information set H1,01 and the citizen's equilibrium play at
H1,01 can be r = 0 or r = 1. Alternatively, the regulator can set aˆL = 0 and
aˆH = 1. Suppose that the citizen does not report an observed act under an
individualized policy with aˆL = 0 and aˆH = 1, i.e. the citizen plays r = 0 at
H0,11 . High types then commit the act and are not reported. They contribute
VH = θH − h − pHcIns to V and the optimal inspection probability is zero. The
ﬁne FH is never imposed and is - as well as the investigation probability qH -
arbitrary. The ban for low types must be enforced through monitoring because
the citizen plays r = 0 at H0,11 . Low types contribute VL = −pLcIns and the
regulator will set the minimal inspection probability necessary to deter them.
They comply if θL − pLFL ≤ 0 or pL ≥ θLFL . This is minimized for FL = w and
pL =
θL
w
.2 The investigation probability qL is arbitrary and the outcome for the
regulator is
V
({
0,
θL
w
, qL, w
}
L
, {1, 0, qH , FH}H
)
= nH (θH − h)− nL θL
w
cIns. (I.5)
Consider second that the regulator enforces a uniform ban only partially to
induce diﬀerent behavior of agents. A uniform policy that does not rely on citizen
reporting, i.e. q < cR
b
, to enforce the ban only for low types is not a possible
equilbrium outcome: If q < cR
b
the citizen will not report an observation and the
regulator maximizes V = nH (θH − h)−npcIns subject to θL−pF ≤ 0, θH−pF > 0
and F ≤ w. Thus he sets F = w and p = θL
w
yielding V
({
0, θL
w
, q < cR
b
, w
})
=
nH (θH − h) − n θLw cIns which is a smaller than that for (I.5). Conversely, the
regulator can rely on reports and thus sets q ≥ cR
b
. The policy must also satisfy
θL − qF ≤ 0 and θH − qF > 0 to enforce the ban partially. So max
{
cR
b
, θL
F
} ≤
q < θH
F
must hold. Since citizens report the acts committed by high types, the
regulator receives V = nH (θH − h− qcInv) − nLpcIns. Inspections lead to costs
2Note that
(
r = 0 if H0,11
)
is then sequential rational for the citizen as regulatory inspections
guarantee that only high types being allowed commit the act.
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without providing deterrence and p = 0 is optimal. Now, the expression for V is
maximal if q is minimal. If cR
b
≤ θL
w
it is optimal to set F = w and q = θL
w
. If
instead cR
b
≥ θL
w
the regulator has to choose q = cR
b
and he sets the ﬁne F such
that θL − cRb F ≤ 0 and θH − cRb F > 0 are satisﬁed. Without loss of generality
let F = θL
b
cR
. Therefore, if the regulator relies on citizen reporting to enforce a
uniform ban partially his pay-oﬀ is
V
({
0, 0,
θL
w
,w
})
= nH (θH − h)− nH θL
w
cInv (I.6)
if the deterrence criterion is fulﬁlled, that is max
{
cR
b
, θL
w
}
= θL
w
and
V
({
0, 0,
cR
b
, θL
b
cR
})
= nH (θH − h)− nH cR
b
cInv (I.7)
if the reporting criterion is fulﬁlled, that is max
{
cR
b
, θL
w
}
= cR
b
.
Given that the citizen does not report an observed act under an individual-
ized policy, i.e. he plays r = 0 at H0,11 , the previous analysis of policies is an
exhaustive characterization of equilibrium outcomes for the regulator. Compar-
ing the outcomes in (I.3) - (I.7) leads to propositions I.1 and I.2 which establish
the existence and uniqueness (see the appendix for the proof of uniqueness) of
the optimal choice by the regulator.
Proposition I.1 (Existence) The regulatory game has an equilibrium in pure
strategies where in equilibrium, the citizen plays
(
r = 0 if H0,11
)
. The equilibrium
policy is
(FB) {0, 0, 1, w} with V = 0 if c = nH (θH − h),
(UP) {1, 0, q, F} with V = nH (θH − h)− nL (h− θL) if c = nL (h− θL),
(TP)
({
0, θL
w
, qL, w
}
L
, {1, 0, qH , FH}H
)
with V = nH (θH − h) − nL θLw cIns if c =
nL
θL
w
cIns,
(PBD)
{
0, 0, θL
w
, w
}
with V = nH (θH − h)− nH θLw cInv if c = nH θLw cInv and
(PBR)
{
0, 0, cR
b
, θL
b
cR
}
with V = nH (θH − h)− nH cRb cInv if c = nH cRb cInv
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where
c = min
{
nH (θH − h) ;nL (h− θL) ;nL θL
w
cIns; max
{
nH
θL
w
cInv;nH
cR
b
cInv
}}
.3
The questions what happens if citizens play r = 1 at H0,11 and whether the
policies chosen as stated in proposition I.1 are unique are adressed in
Proposition I.2 (Uniqueness) For all parameter constellations the rules chosen
in equilibrium are unique.
The key to understanding proposition I.1 is the minimum cost criterion c that
trades oﬀ the diﬀerent types of enforcement costs and the harm from crime. This
criterion determines which of the ﬁve possible equilibrium outcomes is optimally
chosen by the regulator. Of the ﬁve outcomes, only one, namely TP, is character-
ized by a tailored policy that is sensitive to diﬀerences between types. It is also
the only outcome in which the regulator chooses to monitor himself. The four
other outcomes are characterized by a uniform standard, even though they are
uniform in diﬀerent ways and for diﬀerent reasons: Outcome FB involves a fully
enforced ban and arises when the costs of uniformity are low on account of low
total beneﬁts from high types, either because nH is low or because θH is close to
h. Outcome UP is characterized by uniformly permitting the act and arises when
the harm avoided through regulation is small. Outcome PBD involves a par-
tially enforced ban whose investigation intensity is determined by the deterrence
criterion because θL
w
> cR
b
. Outcome PBR on the other hand involves a par-
tially enforced ban whose investigation intensity is determined by the reporting
criterion because cR
b
> θL
w
.
The key insights of proposition I.1 can be illustrated graphically. Graphs
(a), (b), and (c) show the geometry of outcomes deﬁned by proposition I.1 in(
θL,
nH
nL
)
-space for diﬀerent parameter constellations. The graphs capture three
combinations of investigation and reporting costs: Graph (a) shows the case of
high investigation costs in the presence of low reporting costs, graph (b) the case
3Given the assumption that the indiﬀerent regulator allows the act, then if c is not unique
the regulator chooses {1, 0, q, F} if c = nL (h− θL). If nL (h− θL) 6= c the regulator chooses({
0, θLw , qL, w
}
L
, {1, 0, qH , FH}H
)
if c = nL
θL
w cIns. If additionally nL
θL
w cIns 6= c the regulator's
choice cannot be further isolated without additional assumptions.
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium Policies.
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of low investigation costs and low reporting costs, and graph (c) the case of low
investigation costs and high reporting costs. The case of high investigation and
high reporting costs does not merit a dedicated discussion.4 Given the minimum
cost criterion c, the relative position and size of the ﬁve regulatory outcomes
arise in an intuitive way. The relative position of FB, UP, TP, PBD, and PBR
in
(
θL,
nH
nL
)
-space captures the fact that the minimium cost criterion c depends
positively on nH for FB, PBD, and PBR and positively on nL for UP and TP.
Therefore, if the population contains a large number of high types, the outcome
must be UP or TP since total investigation costs would otherwise be excessive
(PBR and PBD) or too many high type beneﬁts are forfeited (FB).
The equilibria with a uniform ban, i.e. FB, PBD, and PBR, occur only for
a relatively small fraction of high types. The speciﬁc outcome depends on low
type beneﬁts. Consider ﬁrst outcomes PBD and PBR. Which outcome prevails
depends on whether the reporting or the deterrence criterion holds. In case
of reporting criterion, a minimum fraction of violators has to be sanctioned to
incentivize citizens to report. For a small θL this minimum fraction exceeds
the minimum investigation probability that provides suﬃcient deterrence and
vice versa. Thus, if θL is small (large), PBD (PBR) cannot occur. Because
both investigation probabilities do not depend on the number of low and high
types, the boundary is a vertical line. Compare now outcomes FB and PBD.
Enforcement costs under PBD, i.e. investigation costs for high types, depend
on the investigation frequency. Enforcement costs under FB, on the other hand,
are zero as deterrence for all agents is provided by the threat of facing a report.
Because in PBD, investigation costs increase in θL, PBD dominates FB for small
low type beneﬁts and vice versa. Note that under both policies low types are
deterred and so the regulator compares investigation costs for high types and
4See the appendix for the derivation of the graphs. The graphs presented are derived for
the case nH
cR
b cInv < nH (θH − h). This does neither depend on θL nor on nH nor on nL and
so it cannot be displayed in the
(
θL,
nH
nL
)
-space.
For the reverse case with high reporting and high investigation costs - nH
cR
b cInv >
nH (θH − h) - the graph looks similar to the bottom one. However, equilibria PBR and PBD
cannot occur: First, PBR cannot be the outcome because nH
cR
b cInv > nH (θH − h). Sec-
ond, PBD cannot be the outcome because this requires nH
θL
w cInv > nH
cR
b cInv but then also
nH
θL
w cInv > nH (θH − h) holds. If nH cRb cInv > nH (θH − h) in the middle lower area equilib-
rium FB prevails.
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forfeiting high types' beneﬁts. Which of these yields higher losses does not depend
on the number of low and high types and so the boundary is a vertical line.
Summing up, if the relative number of high types is suﬃcently small, the uniform
ban is partially enforced if θL is small and is fully enforced otherwise. Therefore,
PBR prevails in the lower left part of the graph, PBD in the lower middle one,
and FB in the lower right section.
Comparing the graphs captures how the relative position and size of the out-
comes change as reporting and investigation costs change. Graph (b) captures
a situation with lower investigation costs relative to graph (a). This diﬀerence
renders a reliance on reporting cheaper from the regulator's point of view and
decreases the parameter space over which TP is chosen. At the same time, use of
partially enforced bans increases, with PBR increasing at the expense of TP and
PBD increasing at the expense of all other non-partial outcomes. This reﬂects
the lower cost of access to investigations as an enforcement device. Comparing
graphs (b) and (c), the increase in reporting costs reduces the attractiveness of
relying on citizens for θL small because inspections become relatively cheaper
compared to the increased reporting criterion until the regulator becomes indif-
ferent between TP and UP. The changes between PBR, PBD, and UP are subtle
and are discussed in detail below.
To complete the characterization, it is useful to understand more about how
the regulatory outcomes change in response to changes in θL and
nH
nL
, the axes of
graphs (a) through (c). Starting with graph (a), consider points A and B, located
in the TP and UP areas, respectively. Starting at point A, where θL is small and
the fraction of high types is large, and traveling towards B, we see an increase in
θL leading to low type net damages decreasing and inspection costs increasing. At
some point, therefore, we cross the boundary beyond which it becomes optimal to
allow the act for low types as well (point B). Keeping θL constant at the level of A,
but decreasing the fraction of high types, we arrive at point C where the outcome
is still TP. Increasing θL at these shares of high types to low types in the direction
of E, the regulator's trade-oﬀ diﬀers from the previous one: Instead of trading oﬀ
inspection costs and low type net damages, he now trades oﬀ inspection costs and
forfeiting high type beneﬁts. Because the fraction of high types is now smaller,
it becomes proﬁtable to forfeit the beneﬁts and fully enforce the uniform ban.
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The equilibrium becomes FB as in point E. The boundary between FB and TP
is increasing in θL: A rising θL makes inspections less attractive but can be oﬀset
by an increase in the number of high types, thus making FB less attractive. If θL
increases further from E, inspection costs do not increase because no inspections
are carried out while low type net damages continue to fall. Then forfeiting high
type beneﬁts is no longer optimal but incurring low type net damages is. Thus
UP becomes the optimal policy (point F). The boundary between FB and UP is
decreasing in θL because an increase in θL, making UP attractive, can be oﬀset by
a decrease in the number of high types as this decreases beneﬁts forfeited under
FB.
Decreasing the fraction of high types at C and D further, relative investi-
gation costs under partial enforcement also decrease. A ban for low types can
then be enforced through investigations of high types at lower costs compared to
inspections and thus PBR and PBD become the optimal choice (points G and
H). Moving from C to G, the boundary between TP and PBR is increasing in θL
because an increase in θL, rendering inspections less attractive, can be oﬀset by
an increase in nH , which - in turn - increases total investigation costs. Moving
from D to H, the boundary between TP and PBD is a horizontal line as in both
outcomes the probability of punishment that deters low types is the same: In
TP, low types get inspected whereas in PBD, high types get investigated which
provides the deterrence for the low types. Thus, the boundary equals the fraction
of inspection costs and investigation costs, cIns
cInv
. Moving from H to K increases
the investigation costs, which - beyond the boundary - exceed high type beneﬁts
that are forfeited under FB (point K).
In Graph (b), point E is now located in outcome PBD on account of the lower
investigation costs. Increasing θL now leads to increases in investigation costs, in
contrast to graph (a) because E now involves actual investigations. At the same
time, low type net damages decrease so that the regulator prefers UP, under
which he incurs these damages rather than investigation costs (point F). The
new boundary separating UP and PBD is decreasing in θL because an increase
in θL, making UP more attractive, can be oﬀset by a decrease in the number of
high types as this lowers total investigation costs.
Finally, point E in graph (c) is now located in outcome PBR on account of
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higher reporting costs. Increasing θL now does not increase investigation costs.
These remain unchanged because the investigation probability necessary for de-
terrence remains at cR
b
to incentivize citizens to report in line with the reporting
criterion. However, low type net damages decrease and the regulator switches
to UP (point F). As in the previous case, the new boundary is decreasing in θL
because an increase in low type beneﬁts lowering net damages can be oﬀset by a
decrease in the number of high types lowering total investigation costs.
4.3 Two impossibility corollaries
Propositions I.1 and I.2 are derived under two meaningful, but potentially limiting
assumptions. The ﬁrst is that the regulator combines a uniform standard with
a uniform monitoring and enforcement strategy. The second assumption is that
citizens are norm takers, i.e. citizens' beneﬁts of reporting are not conditional on
the agent's type. In the following we ﬁrst combine a uniform standard with the
possibility of tailored monitoring and enforcement to examine the implications
of doing so in proposition I.3. Secondly, we extend the analysis to the case of
welfare-oriented citizens. In contrast to norm-takers, these only derive a positive
beneﬁt from reporting a low type, i.e. an agent who - through his act - imposes
a net loss on society.
4.3.1 Uniform standards and tailored monitoring and en-
forcement
The assumption of uniform standards plus uniform monitoring and enforcement
may appear unduly restrictive: After all, the regulator knows each agent's type.
It would therefore seem productive for the regulator to condition his monitoring
and enforcement strategy on this knowledge and thus improve on the regulatory
outcome. Here we show that it is not possible for the regulator to do so: Rather
than improving on the eﬃciency of the regulatory outcome, conditioning the
monitoring and enforcement strategy on type information will - at best - not
improve on the outcome a uniform standard can deliver and will - at worst -
reduce its beneﬁts.
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If a uniform standard does not have to be combined with a uniform moni-
toring and enforcement strategy, the regulator can condition the monitoring and
enforcement strategy applicable to each agent on its type. Inspections, investiga-
tions, and ﬁne levels can therefore depend on agents' types. The policies avail-
able are {aˆ, pL, pH , qL, qH , FL, FH} as the uniform policy and ({1, pL, qL, FL}L ,
{0, pH , qH , FH}H) and ({0, pL, qL, FL}L , {1, pH , qH , FH}H) as the individualized
ones. The consequences of the possibility of combining uniform standards with
individualized monitoring and enforcement strategies are summarized in5
Proposition I.3 (Uniform standards and individualized monitoring and enforce-
ment) If uniform standards can be combined with individualized monitoring and
enforcement and citizens report agents committing acts, the equilibrium policy of
the regulatory game is
(i) {1, 0, 0, qL, qH , FL, FH} with V = nH (θH − h) − nL (h− θL) if nL (h− θL) ≤
nL
θL
w
cIns
(ii)
{
0, θL
w
, qL, w
}
L
, {1, 0, qH , FH}H with V = nH (θH − h)−nL θLw cIns if nL (h− θL) >
nL
θL
w
cIns.
From a regulatory point of view, the result in proposition I.3 is rather disap-
pointing. The setting is promising as it combines the two seemingly productive
assets: On the one hand, there is the possibility of citizen reports. Properly
harnessed, these reports provide the information necessary to overcome the reg-
ulator's hidden action problem. On the other hand, there is full ﬂexibility in
monitoring and enforcement for the regulator, with the expected improvements
from selective targeting of enforcement.
Despite these attractive features, the outcome of this set-up collapses into a
setting "without citizens": The regulator will choose a policy that induces high
types to commit the act and will enforce a ban for low types if and only if net
damages from low types outweigh inspection costs. The general public's monitor-
ing ability goes unused. The reason is that at all information sets potentially on
the equilibrium path where ai = 1 the citizen does not report, especially at that
set where the act is uniformly banned, i.e. at H01 . If the citizen otherwise did
5See the appendix for the proof.
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report the regulator would exploit this behavior to enforce a ban for low types at
no costs by setting qLFL ≥ θL. At the same time he would set a policy inducing
aH = 1 to realize high type net beneﬁts. As citizens report this behavior the
regulator has to carry out costly investigations with probability qH . Contrary
to the basic set-up where a uniform ban had to be combined with a uniform in-
vestigation probability, the regulator now can avoid these investigation costs by
setting qH = 0. This additional feature however nulliﬁes the citizen's incentives
to report as only those agents commit the act who will not be investigated and
thus not be sanctioned.
The mechanism is familiar from the last section. There, however, it was
operational only if the regulator sets individualized standards combined with in-
dividualized monitoring and enforcement strategies. Restricting the regulator to
a combination of a uniform standard with a uniform monitoring and enforcement
strategy circumvented this mechanism. Conversely, allowing the regulator to con-
dition the response to a report on an agent's type when using uniform standards
makes the mechanism reappear.
4.3.2 Welfare-concerned citizens
A similar ﬁnding arises if one assumes that citizens are not norm takers but take
a welfare perspective. Citizens acting on wider welfare motives would like high
types to commit the act. Therefore, a citizen receives no beneﬁt from reporting a
high type. Thus, welfare-concerned citizens receive beneﬁts from reporting only
if they report an agent whose act decreases welfare, i.e. low types, and if the reg-
ulator subsequently undertakes enforcement actions. The consequences if citizen
reporting is driven by the welfare motive are shown in
Proposition I.4 (Welfare-concerned citizens) If positive beneﬁts from reporting
require reporting a low type, the equilibria PBD and PBR disappear. The regulator
can achieve V = 0 from FB only if in equilibrium the citizen reports at H01 .
The intuition underpinning proposition I.4 is essentially similar to the case of
combining uniform standards with tailored monitoring and enforcement, so we
omit the analogous proof: As in proposition I.3, the reason is that sequential
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rationality no longer unequivocally requires the citizen to report at H01 . For
the regulator to be productive a uniform ban must lead to aL = 0.
6 Thus, in
equilibrium only high types, i.e. those whom the welfare-oriented citizen does
not want to report, would commit the act under a uniform ban. Therefore, if in
equilibrium H01 is reached with positive probability, reporting at this set is not
sequential rational and low types cannot be deterred by the threat of a report.
This removes the mechanism that underpins the PBD and PBR equilibria for
norm-taking citizens, namely by maintaining a suﬃciently high probability that
the perpetrator gets punished independent of type7.
This logic explains why welfare-oriented rather than norm-taking citizens will
at best lead to the same outcome for the regulator. Welfare orientation appears
to promise savings from not having to investigate high types in the PBR and PBD
equilibria. Since these equilibria fail to survive under sequential rationality, so
does the regulator's opportunity to achieve aL = 0 and aH = 1 while exploiting
deterrence of citizen reports. Whether the regulator can realize V = 0 under
the full ban (FB) depends on the citizen's equilibrium play at H01 . Under FB,
H01 is not reached and, thus, both reporting and not reporting can be sequential
rational at this information set. As FB requires reporting8 at H01 the regulator
cannot realize V = 0 if the citizen does not report at H01 .
6Otherwise the regulator would uniformly allow the act.
7Note that the regulator does not partially enforce a uniform ban by relying on inspections
as this can be accompanied with a tailored policy.
8Note that a uniform ban fully enforced through inspections yields a lower V than the
tailored policy with âL = 0 and âH = 1.
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5 Discussion of part I
The previous sections set out a number of key results regarding the L.B. Jeﬀeries
problem. In passing, it should be noted that the model's results also apply to a
case where citizens and agents are not randomly matched, but where there are
restrictions on policy disclosure. Then, in case of tailored policies only agents
of type i learn the policy for type i. Policies would not be communicated to
the general public. Citizens then do not know which agent is allowed to commit
the act, leading to an equivalent problem as the one studied in this paper. An
agent would only know the policy he faces. The assumptions are realistic for two
reasons. First, in many countries and for many activities that are regulated legal
constraints prohibit agency information disclosure if the information provided
contains individualized data. For instance, agency information disclosure is often
not allowed if it reveals potentially valuable data to competitors. The second
argument is information overload.1 The general public can have limited cognitive
abilities and therefore cannot handle an amount of information that is suﬃciently
large.2 The ﬁndings in such a setting can be shown to be equivalent to the results
derived here, but also include a second equilibrium that can only be eliminated
through further reﬁnements of the equilibrium concept.
Various other extensions present themselves. One is to include technical sub-
stitutes that reduce reporting cost (Grabosky 1992). However, as the uncondi-
tional beneﬁts from reporting already exceed reporting costs for every citizen, it
is clear that further initiatives to reduce the costs cannot enhance the supply of
1See Edmunds and Morris (2000) and Eppler and Mengis (2004) for reviews of theoretical
and empirical studies on information overload in the management related literature.
2Actually, this argument means that the regulator could communicate tailored policies to
the public. However, the consequence would be that a citizen is simply not able to ﬁnd out
which agent is regulated in which way because he has too much information at hand. The result
would be the same as if citizens were not told the policies.
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reports in the present setting. For the extension to have traction then, a model
with heterogeneous citizens would be required. For example, some citizens may
have greater fear of reprisal than others. Also, agents may be able to invest
in raising the reporting costs of citizens. Another extension is to tie the model
more closely with the harm avoidance motive that some of the literature invokes
(Heyes and Kapur 2009a). In that case, the beneﬁt b to the citizen would equal
the harm h avoided as a result and the ﬁndings would go through as had. Relax-
ing the assumption about relationship of harm from acts to beneﬁts from acts, a
diﬀerent cost-harm pattern such as h > θH > θL can result in a reconsideration
of the tenet that positive monitoring costs imply relaxing the standard (Viscusi
and Zeckhauser 1979). Under given circumstances, it is trivial to show that a
motivated public can help the regulator reattain the ﬁrst best outcome.
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6 Conclusion of part I
Going back to the starting point of the paper, we asked the question why -
in a world with highly heterogeneous populations - regulators concerned about
eﬃciency should give up the opportunity of using individualized rules. While
fairness and equity reasons often serve as explanations why regulators impose
uniform rules, this choice seems much harder to justify on eﬃciency grounds.
Existing justiﬁcations emphasize both coordination beneﬁts and reductions in
the cost of regulatory design when agents' individual circumstances are costly to
observe. The present paper complements these justiﬁcations by focusing instead
on the monitoring and enforcement instruments that make regulations 'stick'
(Heyes 1998). The resulting parsimonious and stylized model highlights a mech-
anism that is at once obvious and overlooked: In a world of limited monitoring
and enforcement resources, regulators can obtain underappreciated beneﬁts due
to harnessing the willingness of citizens such as L.B. Jeﬀeries to report oﬀenders.
Individualized regulations - while reducing compliance costs for the regulated -
also limit the extent to which motivated citizens can feel rewarded for reporting
infractions: An observed activity might be banned for one person, but allowed
for another, thus detracting from the gains of doing good by reporting. Properly
designed uniform standards, on the other hand, maintain the motivation to report
infractions, giving rise to reduction in monitoring costs and hence to beneﬁts for
the regulator.
How profound is this insight? Clearly, it highlights the public's contribution
to enforcement as a determinant of rule design, with a speciﬁc focus on the ear-
liest stage of the monitoring and enforcement process. If at all, the literature
tends to focus on its role in later stages of enforcement. This risks overlooking
the important role voluntary reports to regulators play at the outset of the en-
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forcement process. In addition, it gives rise to non-obvious regulatory policies:
Uniform rules make it sequentially rational for citizens to provide costly reporting
eﬀort, but can also force the regulator to behave in a way that seems at odds
with intuition. In a world in which only one of two groups is an obvious target of
regulation, the regulator would be observed pursuing only the non-target group.
The reason is that this pursuit maintains the supply of reporting eﬀort, the threat
of which eﬀectively deters the target group from committing their socially un-
desirable activities. We show the mechanisms underpinning the results and how
they are related to this and alternative information structures.
Taken together, this paper formalizes a basic point in Hitchcock (1954): With-
out L.B. Jeﬀeries observing by happenstance the circumstantial evidence of a
crime, a crime would have gone undetected and unretributed. But in order for
L.B. Jeﬀeries to act on his impulse of civic virtue by reporting, it is important
that he has to know nothing about his anonymous neighbor in order to know that
a crime has happened. The commitment of the regulator to treat everyone the
same is a key to L.B. Jeﬀeries' contribution.
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Part II
Improving The Monitoring
Capability of Citizen Monitoring
Programs: Desirable or Not?
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7 Introduction to part II
Among environmental policy researchers, the role of the citizen in environmental
regulation has been undergoing something of a reconsideration in recent years.
A view of citizens as passive victims of pollution has been replaced by a view
of citizens as active contributors to regulatory outcomes. A growing literature
focuses on understanding the ways in which citizens and environmental groups
shape environmental regulation. Typical cases comprise instances of informal
regulation (e.g. Kathuria 2007, Blackman 2000)1 in which communities facing
environmental threats attempt - more or less successfully - to regulate pollution
in the face of weak or absent state authorities. They also include the eﬀects
of regulation through information (e.g. Cutter and Neidell 2009, Evans et al.
2009, Graﬀ Zivin and Neidell 2009)2. Using contest models, Liston-Heyes (2001)
and Settle et al. 2001 - among others3 - examine settings where private parties
inﬂuence regulatory decisions.
The reevaluation of the role of the citizen has been particularly palpable in
the context of environmental monitoring and enforcement: From the detection
of potential infractions and subsequent complaints (Dasgupta and Wheeler 1996,
Eckert 2006, Weersink and Raymond 2007) to the pursuit of violators in courts
(Naysnerski and Tietenberg 1992, Langpap 2007, 2008, Langpap and Shimshack
2010), decisions by citizens can inﬂuence and shape regulatory reality at all stages
1See also Blackman and Bannister (1998), Hartman et al. (1997), Pargal et al. (1997), Afsah
et al. (1996), Pargal and Wheeler (1996), Hettige et al. (1996).
2See also Bennear and Olmstead (2008), Cohen and Santhakumar (2007), Goldar and Baner-
jee (2004), Foulon et al. (2002), Dasgupta et al. (2001), Tietenberg and Wheeler (2001),
Khanna et al. (1998), Tietenberg (1998), Konar and Cohen (1997), Hamilton (1995), Kennedy
et al. (1994), Magat and Viscusi (1992). Dasgupta et al. (2006) provide a survey on disclosure
strategies.
3See also Heyes (1997), Hurley and Shogren (1997), Baik and Shogren (1994), and Park and
Shogren (2003).
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of the process (Tietenberg 1998, Tietenberg and Wheeler 2001). Moreover, where
present, the general public's participation has often been linked to better envi-
ronmental performance and improved eﬃciency of environmental regulation (Das-
gupta et al. 2000, Escobar and Chávez 2010, Huang and Miller 2006).
Given the empirical evidence, researchers have argued that measures designed
to support the general public's role in environmental regulation should be adopted
more widely (Tietenberg and Wheeler 2001), in particular in the area of environ-
mental monitoring: Given the signiﬁcant resources required for an eﬀective mon-
itoring system, environmental lawyers (e.g. Kysar and Salzman 2008, Thomp-
son 2000), sociologists (Forrester 1999, Overdevest and Mayer 2008, 2010) and
policy institutions such as the World Bank (World Bank 2006, 1992) nowadays
frequently recommend harnessing citizens to perform simple monitoring tasks
whose results can serve as inputs into regulatory processes. Citizen monitoring
initiatives such as 'bucket brigades' (O'Rourke and Macey 2003) are illustrative
of the general idea: Members of the public collect samples in simple containers
("buckets"), carry out rudimentary analyses, and inform regulators in case of a
signiﬁcant ﬁnding. The idea has been practically implemented in many devel-
oping countries such as India, Philippines, and Kenya to mention just a few4,
but initiatives such as bucket brigades, 'riverkeepers', and 'baykeepers' have also
evolved under U.S. EPA guidance. The EPA's National Directory of Volunteer
Monitoring Programs currently lists roughly 900 organizations that monitor and
assess water quality in all states and Washington, D.C. except Nevada.5
A well-known limitation of citizen monitoring is the extent to which citizens
are able to provide an accurate picture of ﬁrms' environmental performance to
regulators (e.g. Overdevest and Mayer 2010, Hunsberger et al. 2005, Savan et al
2003, O'Rourke and Macey 2003, Thompson 2000, Heiman 1997). Inaccuracies
take two forms, a failure to detect and report a violation that did occur ('false neg-
ative') or, alternatively, strategically or negligently reporting a violation when,
4One example for an organization that aims to train and give technical assistance for
using buckets to aﬀected communities all over the world is Global Community Monitor
[http://www.gcmonitor.org/].
Another organization acting for similar purposes with a focus on water pollution is the Wa-
terkeeper Alliance [http://www.waterkeeper.org/].
5Source: http://yosemite.epa.gov/water/volmon.nsf/Home?openform; Last check on August
28th 2010.
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in fact, no violation occurred ('false positive'). This paper is concerned with
measures that reduce 'false negatives', that is improvements in citizens' capac-
ity to detect and report pollution events. This requires members of the public
taking meaningful samples at the right time and the right place, following an
adequate protocol in handling and testing the sample in time, completing report
forms in the correct manner, and forwarding the report in a timely manner to
regulatory agencies so as to enable the latter to respond and verify suﬃciently
rapidly (Ottinger 2010, O'Rourke and Macey 2003). A combination of technologi-
cal (standardized kits), procedural (assay protocols), and institutional safeguards
(such as letters of agreement) are supposed to enhance the quality of citizen mon-
itoring. This is easily understood: If the philosophy of citizen monitoring is to
provide credible and actionable information for regulators (Kysar and Salzman
2008, Overdevest and Mayer 2008), it would seem obvious that the better citizens
become at alerting regulators to pollution incidents, the greater the contribution
citizens can make towards increasing environmental quality. The attempts by
U.S. EPA and State authorities to foster data collection and reporting by citi-
zen groups would seem a straightforward step towards improving regulatory out-
comes. Everything else equal, greater monitoring accuracy, "better buckets" in
other words, should be associated with higher welfare and lower environmental
harm.
In this paper, we use a simple model to show that this logic does not necessar-
ily hold. In fact, it is possible that in settings with enhanced citizen monitoring
quality, ﬁrms comply less, harm is greater, and overall welfare is lower. Even if
welfare increases overall, citizens' welfare may decrease, thus removing incentives
for citizens to adopt measures that reduce false negatives. The reason for these
counterintuitive results is the non-trivial interaction between the quality of moni-
toring, the ﬁrm's propensity to violate, and the regulator's propensity to inspect.
Both ﬁrm and regulator weigh costs and beneﬁts of their decision: For costly
inspections to be worthwhile to the regulator in absence of a complaint requires
a suﬃcient chance of ﬁnding a violation, into which the propensity to violate and
error of sampling enter in an essentially substitutive manner. Likewise, for the
ﬁrm to violate requires enough of a chance of 'getting away with it'. Increasing
quality means, in the ﬁrst instance, less of that chance, and as a result, inspec-
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tions have to be disproportionately less frequent in order to violations to occur at
all. In the circumstances that the paper characterizes, both eﬀects jointly lead to
higher expected harm through inducing more non-compliance. The countervail-
ing eﬀects of lower inspection and compliance costs may outweigh the negative
welfare eﬀects to produce overall welfare gains, but do not have to.
The spirit of the paper is not to provide a complete characterization of the
interaction between the parties. Instead, we proceed by construction. The simple
model on which this paper is based employs a simple three-player set-up. There is
a ﬁrm that faces a dichotomous choice between costly compliance on the one hand
and violation at the risk of being saddled with recovery costs upon detection on
the other. The citizen suﬀers harm through violations that can be oﬀset through
recovery action. Citizens can take samples at a cost. The monitoring quality
captures the likelihood that a pollution event is successfully detected and serves
as a shorthand for the sequence of steps that needs to be completed for a pollution
event to be communicated to a regulator. The regulator can inspect without a
report from a citizen or investigate a report, both at a cost, and take enforcement
action in form of forcing the ﬁrm to recover. We then prove the existence of a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the mentioned properties that give rise to our
results.
By examining the interaction between monitoring quality, citizen contribu-
tions to monitoring and enforcement, and regulatory outcomes, the paper con-
tributes to the literature on citizen participation in environmental monitoring
and enforcement. More speciﬁcally, by putting the key issue of monitoring qual-
ity center stage, it shares a focus with, yet is distinct from other papers examining
the eﬀects and consequences of private actors contributing to the regulatory pro-
cess at the monitoring stage (Garoupa 2001, Heyes 2002, Bandyopadhyay and
Chatterjee 2010). Heyes (2002) develops a theory of "ﬁltered enforcement" in
which one possible inputs into the 'ﬁlter' are noisy monitoring reports by an es-
sentially exogenous public that can 'trigger' the enforcement stage. The present
paper diﬀers in that citizens' reports are not exogenously, but the result of an
explicitly modeled decision involving a cost. Considering the cost of reporting,
Garoupa (2001) examines the question of compensating citizens for reporting,
but diﬀers from our model in that the monitoring technology is perfectly ac-
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curate. Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2010) study the impact of reporting
ability diﬀerences between citizen groups on expected crime, but their results
rely on a diﬀerent mechanism implicit in the model set-up. The common concern
among these papers and ours are the crowding eﬀects and pollution outcomes of
citizen activities, a concern shared with the closely related literature on citizen
participation at the enforcement stage (Naysnerski and Tietenberg 1992, Heyes
1998, Heyes and Rickman 1999, Langpap 2007, Langpap and Shimshack 2010).
We compare and contrast our respective results in the discussion section of this
paper.
The paper proceeds as follows: We introduce the model set-up in section
8. Section 9 performs a comparative statics analysis in the neighborhood of the
equilibria of interest to derive the key results and characterize the welfare impacts
of diﬀerent levels of accuracy on the three parties. Section 10 discusses and section
11 concludes.
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8 The model of part II
8.1 Set-up
This section develops a stylized game-theoretic model of citizen monitoring pro-
grams in environmental regulation in which the eﬀects of improving citizens'
monitoring technology to detect and report pollution events can be assessed.
The game involves three players: a ﬁrm taking a decision on compliance, a citi-
zen taking a decision on monitoring, and a regulator balancing costs and beneﬁts
of enforcing regulations through costly inspections and costly investigations of
citizen reports.
The timing of the game sees the ﬁrm moving ﬁrst, followed by the citizen
and the regulator (see ﬁgure 8.1): At the beginning the ﬁrm decides whether to
comply with a pollution regulation or not. It can, for instance, run abatement
equipment that avoids emitting a certain pollutant into a medium, such as a
river or the air. If the ﬁrm does not pollute, it incurs compliance costs ccom. If it
pollutes, it imposes future harm h on the citizen.
The ﬁrm's decision on whether to pollute or not is private knowledge and not
observable by the citizen. However, the citizen can undertake costly activities
that can bring the polluted state of the medium to the attention of the regulator.
As a shorthand for the various activities that constitute the monitoring process,
we assume that the citizen takes a sample with sampling cost csam and with a
probability q of detecting an actual pollution event. The probability of a false
negative result of the assay is 1 − q. In the event that the assay indicates the
presence of 'pollution', the citizen reports this observation to the regulator who
then decides whether to investigate the incidence at cost cinv. Investigations are
necessary to collect judicial evidence that meets the relevant standard of proof
49
and truthfully reveal the ﬁrm's decision. The focus on false negatives implies
that the regulator can conclude from the presence of a report that the sample
was taken and that the ﬁrm polluted. The regulator's information set at that
point therefore contains a single node.
Both in the event of the citizen not sampling or in the event of the assay failing
to detect pollution, no report is ﬁled. In keeping with the reality of existing mon-
itoring programs, therefore, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence:
The regulator does not know whether the ﬁrm polluted and whether the sample
was not taken or whether it was taken and did not - correctly or falsely - indicate
'no pollution'. Thus, the regulator's information set where he did not receive a
report contains four nodes with the respective histories (i) pollution and sample
but false negative result (the regulator's belief that this is the prior play of the
game is µ1), (ii) pollution and no sample ( µ2), (iii) no pollution and no sample
(µ3), and (iv) no pollution and sample with a correct negative result (µ4). In ei-
ther case the regulator decides whether to monitor on his own using inspections.
These cost cins and truthfully reveal whether the ﬁrm polluted. Investigations
or inspections establishing pollution imply that the ﬁrm is forced to recover.1
Recovery eliminates harm at costs crec > ccom for the ﬁrm and constitutes the
ﬁnal stage of the game.
In an alternative timing the regulator would decide whether to inspect be-
fore the citizen makes his sampling decision. We analyze the other case because
citizens typically are closer to potential polluters. They receive a signal about pol-
lution, e.g. bucket brigades' sniﬀers who recognize malodor, and can react quickly
on pollution evidence. In fact, one of the main purposes of citizen monitoring
is to provide an alert function that allows the regulator to quickly respond to
pollution incidents. This naturally requires that citizens act before the regulator
comes into play.
We now turn to the strategy sets and payoﬀs of the three players. Consider
ﬁrst the players' strategies. The ﬁrm's strategy of compliance is given by the
probability with which the ﬁrm pollutes and denoted by α ∈ [0, 1]. Analogously,
1For simplicity we do not assume that the ﬁrm also has to pay a ﬁne in case of pollution.
A ﬁne would increase the ﬁrm's negative payoﬀ after investigations or inspections. However,
as will become clear below, introducing such a ﬁne will not alter the results qualitatively. It
would only change the equilbrium choices quantitatively.
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the citizen's probability of taking the sample is denoted by β ∈ [0, 1] and, ﬁnally,
the regulator's probability of investigations and inspections by pinv ∈ [0, 1] and
pins ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Secondly, the expected payoﬀ u for the citizen is
u = −α {(1− β) (1− pins) + β [q (1− pinv) + (1− q) (1− pins)]}h− βcsam.
(II.1)
The citizen suﬀers future harm h if the ﬁrm pollutes (α) and the regulator under-
takes no enforcement actions. This arises in three circumstances: (1) The citizen
does not take the sample and the regulator does not inspect ((1− β) (1− pins)),
(2) the sample is taken but the regulator does not investigate in case of a report
(βq (1− pinv)), or (3) the regulator does not inspect in case of a false negative
result (β (1− q) (1− pins)). Additionally, the citizen incurs sampling costs when-
ever he takes the sample.
The expected payoﬀ pi for the ﬁrm is
pi = −α {(1− β) pins + β [qpinv + (1− q) pins]} crec − (1− α) ccom.
The ﬁrm has to pay for recovery whenever it pollutes and the regulator subse-
quently undertakes enforcement actions. Thus, in case of pollution (α) it has
to pay for recovery in three circumstances: (1) The citizen does not take the
sample but the regulator inspects ((1− β) pins), (2) the citizen takes the sample
and the regulator investigates in case of a correct positive sample (βqpinv), and
ﬁnally (3) the regulator inspects in case of a false negative sample (β (1− q) pins).
Additionally, if the ﬁrm does not pollute (1− α) it incurs compliance costs.
For the regulator we presume a welfare approach: He takes the ﬁrm's and the
citizen's payoﬀs as well as inspection and investigation costs into account. The
regulator's expected payoﬀ W is then
W = −α
 β
[
q (pinv (cinv + crec) + (1− pinv)h) +
(1− q) (pins (cins + crec) + (1− pins)h)
]
+ (1− β) [pins (cins + crec) + (1− pins)h]
 (II.2)
− (1− α) pinscins − (1− α) ccom − βcsam.
If the ﬁrm pollutes (α) the regulator incurs enforcement and recovery costs in
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three circumstances: (1) The sample is taken and the regulator investigates
(βqpinv), (2) the sample taken is a false negative and the regulator inspects
(β (1− q) pins), and (3) the sample is not taken and the regulator inspects ((1− β) pins).
If no enforcement actions are carried out (βq (1− pinv) + β (1− q) (1− pins) +
(1− β) (1− pins)), welfare W is decreased by harm. If instead the ﬁrm does not
pollute (1 − α), the regulator incurs inspection costs if he inspects and welfare
is decreased by compliance costs. If the sample is taken, welfare decreases on
account of sampling costs. From the regulator's welfare perspective, a necessary
condition for undertaking enforcement actions at all is that harm exceeds recov-
ery and enforcement costs, i.e. h > crec + max {cins, cinv}. Having described the
structure of the regulatory game we now derive the equilibria.
8.2 Regulatory equilibria
Depending on the precise parameters, the game need not feature a unique equi-
librium. Since the purpose of the paper is to examine the comparative statics of
improving monitoring quality, we do not provide a detailed analysis of all possi-
ble equilibria or discuss issues of equilibrium selection. Instead, we focus on two
salient equilibria: The ﬁrst is a 'full sampling equilibrium' where the citizen plays
the degenerate strategy β = 1. This reﬂects a situation where citizens take air
or water samples, for instance, on a daily basis. This is an extreme scenario, but
nevertheless it can naturally arise in circumstances when the environmental or
health threat on community members is substantial. Potential releases of heavy
metals and carcinogenic substances serve as illustrative examples. The second
equilibrium is a 'no inspection equilibrium' where the citizen follows a mixed
strategy, i.e. 0 < β < 1. The following analysis shows that a low error probabil-
ity in citizen sampling is a necessary condition for the 'no inspection equilibrium'
to occur. Therefore, this scenario points to (a future) situation where citizen
sampling has become suﬃciently accurate so that optimal deterrence might be
solely maintained by private monitoring.
The following contains existence proofs for each of the two equilibria. The
equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), with equilibrium
choices denoted by an asterisk.
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8.2.1 Full sampling equilibrium
The full sampling equilibrium features β = 1. For this to be part of an equilib-
rium, the probability of accurately detecting pollution through sampling has to
be suﬃciently small, i.e. q < ccom
crec
, as will be shown below. Put diﬀerently, the
error probability must be suﬃciently large.
To derive the equilibrium, consider ﬁrst the single-node information set where
the regulator received a report. Sequential rationality requires that he investigates
the report with probability one. Thus, p∗inv = 1. The reason is that the assay
indicates pollution only if the ﬁrm did indeed pollute. Therefore, the regulator -
as well as the citizen - knows that a positive sample can only follow pollution. In
that case there is no uncertainty.
Things are diﬀerent if the regulator did not receive a report. The decision
whether to inspect is then one under uncertainty and the regulator has to form be-
liefs about the prior play of the game. This belief is the key in understanding the
central results of this paper. If the regulator did not receive a report he does not
know whether the ﬁrm polluted and whether the sample was not taken or whether
it was taken and showed a correct or false negative result. Note ﬁrst, that in the
equilibrium with β = 1 the regulator's equilibrium belief that in case of no report
the sample was not taken is zero (i.e. µ2+µ3 = 0) and we do only have to consider
the two nodes where the citizen sampled. In the full sampling equilibrium the reg-
ulator's equilibrium belief that the ﬁrm polluted but the taken sample falsely indi-
cated 'no pollution' µ1, i.e. µ1 = Pr(pollution but false neg. sample | no report),
is relevant. Second, we derive this µ1 as a solution to the regulator's inspection
condition: For a given µ1 and µ4 with µ4 = 1−µ1 the regulator will inspect if and
only if the expected payoﬀ from inspections is larger than from not inspecting,
i.e.
−µ1crec − (1− µ1) ccom − cins − csam ≥ −µ1h− (1− µ1) ccom − csam (II.3)
or equivalently if his belief that he received no report although the ﬁrm polluted
is suﬃciently large:
µ1 ≥ cins
h− crec . (II.4)
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Because 0 < cins
h−crec < 1,
2 (II.4) has to hold with equality: Suppose µ1 >
cins
h−crec .
The regulator then would set pins = 1. The expected payoﬀ for the ﬁrm from
polluting would be −crec < −ccom and it would choose α = 0. But then µ1 = 0
- a contradiction. Assume instead µ1 <
cins
h−crec . The regulator would not inspect,
so pins = 0, yielding the payoﬀ −qcrec for the ﬁrm if it pollutes which is larger
than −ccom because by assumption q < ccomcrec . But then for the ﬁrm polluting
is strictly better than complying and so α = 1. However, then µ1 = 1 - again
a contradiction. Therefore, in equilibrium (II.4) holds with equality. In a per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium beliefs are derived through Bayes' rule given the other
players' equilibrium strategies. Thus, the regulator derives his equilibrium belief
according to
µ1 =
α∗ (1− q)
α∗ (1− q) + (1− α∗) =
α∗ (1− q)
1− α∗q . (II.5)
This must equal the right hand side in (II.4), so that
µ1 =
α∗ (1− q)
1− α∗q =
cins
h− crec . (II.6)
This expression determines the ﬁrm's equilibrium strategy which makes the
regulator indiﬀerent between inspecting and not inspecting if he receives no re-
port:
α∗ =
cins
(1− q) (h− cins − crec) + cins . (II.7)
In equilibrium the ﬁrm's strategy must be such that the regulator's belief µ1
equalizes the expected payoﬀ from inspecting and not inspecting respectively.
According to (II.6) this belief is sensitive to changes in the model's parameters:3
Increases in inspection or recovery costs make inspections c.p. relatively less
attractive and require a higher µ1 - a higher chance of detecting a violation
during inspections - for the regulator to inspect with a positive probability. Thus,
the ﬁrm's equilibrium strategy must increase.4 Conversely, an increase in harm
renders inspections relatively more attractive. To counteract this eﬀect, α∗ has to
2The second inequality holds because by assumption h > crec + max {cins, cinv}.
3The analysis of changes in the citizen's monitoring accuracy, i.e. q, is delegated to the next
section.
4Note that according to (II.7) we get ∂α
∗
∂cins
, ∂α
∗
∂crec
> 0.
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decrease so that the regulator's chance of ﬁnding a violation during inspections
decreases.5
Having described the ﬁrm's equilibrium strategy we now determine the equi-
librium inspection probability p∗ins. Consider the ﬁrm's compliance condition:
The ﬁrm will comply if and only if6
− [q + (1− q) pins] crec ≤ −ccom. (II.8)
This expression has to hold with equality: If the left hand side is larger we would
get α = 1 which according to (II.5) leads to µ1 = 1 contradicting µ1 < 1. If
instead the left hand side is smaller the ﬁrm chooses α = 0 which yields µ1 = 0
contradicting µ1 > 0. So the equilibrium inspection probability is
7
p∗ins =
1
1− q
[
ccom
crec
− q
]
=
ccom − qcrec
(1− q) crec . (II.9)
The regulator's inspection probability must make the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between
polluting and not polluting. Similar to the case of α∗ the inspection probability
is sensitive to changes in the parameters: An increase in compliance costs makes
polluting c.p. relatively more attractive for the ﬁrm. To counteract this eﬀect
the equilibrium inspection probability has to increase to raise expected recovery
costs. Conversely, an increase in recovery costs makes polluting c.p. relatively less
attractive so that in equilibrium inspections have to be carried out less frequently.
Finally, in equilibrium β = 1 must be a best response for the citizen. This
is the case whenever the expected beneﬁt of sampling, relative to not, exceeds
the sampling costs. The citizen's sampling condition is satisﬁed whenever the
harm additionally avoided due to taking the sample exceeds sampling costs, i.e.
whenever
α∗ (1− p∗ins)h− α∗ (1− q) (1− p∗ins)h ≥ csam (II.10)
5This is because ∂α
∗
∂h < 0.
6This expression already takes p∗inv = 1 into account.
7This expression shows that q < ccomcrec is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium with
β = 1.
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or equivalently
qcins (crec − ccom)h
[(1− q) (h− cins − crec) + cins] (1− q) crec ≥ csam (II.11)
holds. Changes in the parameters aﬀect the citizen's incentive to sample: First, an
increase in inspection costs cins increases the harm additionally avoided because
higher inspection costs are accompanied by a higher α∗ leading to more pollution.
Second, higher recovery costs crec likewise increase the harm additionally avoided
due to two eﬀects. On the one hand, an increase in recovery costs yields a higher
α∗, and on the other hand it decreases the equilibrium inspection probability p∗ins.
The former eﬀect leads to more pollution whereas the latter implies c.p. less
recovery after inspections. Third, higher compliance costs ccom mean a decrease
in harm avoided from sampling because higher compliance costs are accompanied
by a higher inspection probability, which implies more recovery in the absence
of sampling. Fourth, an increase in harm h has two counteracting eﬀects. On
the one hand more harm directly aﬀects the citizen negatively but on the other
hand higher harm leads to a lower probability of pollution α∗. Taken together an
increase in harm has an ambiguous eﬀect on the citizen's incentive to sample.8
Before we prove the existence of the 'no inspection equilibrium' we brieﬂy
summarize the results derived so far. If h > crec + max {cins, cinv}, q < ccomcrec and
(II.11) holds, then the regulatory game features a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which the citizen samples with probability one ('full sampling equilibrium')
and the regulator investigates every report. The regulator's belief that the taken
sample falsely indicated 'no pollution' in case of no report must be such that he is
indiﬀerent between inspecting and not inspecting. This µ1 is the right hand side
in (II.6). The ﬁrm's equilibrium strategy that yields this belief and thus makes
the regulator indiﬀerent at the information set where he received no report is
that in (II.7). Finally, the inspection probability that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent
between polluting and not polluting is that in (II.9).
8Formally, these results are derived by diﬀerentiating (II.10) w.r.t. to the respective param-
eters: The left hand side in (II.10) can be written as α∗ (1− p∗ins)hq. Thus, the changes are
ﬁrst ∂α
∗
∂cins
>0
(1− p∗ins)hq > 0, second ∂α
∗
∂crec
>0
(1− p∗ins)hq − α∗ ∂p
∗
ins
∂crec
<0
hq > 0, third −α∗ ∂p∗ins∂ccom
>0
hq < 0
and fourth ∂α
∗
∂h
<0
(1− p∗ins)hq + α∗ (1− p∗ins) q ≶ 0.
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8.2.2 No inspection equilibrium
The other salient equilibrium of the game is the 'no inspection equilibrium'. This
equilibrium does not require β = 1 and so µ2 and µ3 can be greater than zero. Like
in the 'full sampling equilibrium', sequential rationality requires the regulator to
investigate every report, i.e. p∗inv = 1.
Analogously to the inspection condition (II.3), the no inspection condition is
−µ1 (crec + csam)− µ2crec − µ3ccom − µ4 (ccom + csam)− cins <
−µ1 (h+ csam)− µ2h− µ3ccom − µ4 (ccom + csam)
or equivalently9
µ1 + µ2 <
cins
h− crec . (II.12)
The regulator will not inspect if and only if this condition is satisﬁed. Thus given
that (II.12) holds, the regulator's equilibrium inspection probability is p∗ins = 0.
Below we state the parameter restriction that ensures (II.12) is met.
Consider now the ﬁrm's compliance condition along the lines of (II.8): The
ﬁrm complies if and only if
−β∗qcrec ≤ −ccom. (II.13)
In equilibrium this has to hold with equality: If −β∗qcrec < −ccom complying
yields a strictly greater payoﬀ than polluting and so α = 0. But then the citizen's
best response is to never sample, i.e. β = 0 violating −β∗qcrec < −ccom. If instead
−β∗qcrec > −ccom polluting is strictly better than complying, so α = 1 which
implies µ1 + µ2 = 1, violating (II.12).
Because (II.13) holds with equality the citizen's equilibrium strategy is
β∗ =
ccom
qcrec
(II.14)
This is the citizen's mixed strategy that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between com-
9In fact, one can show that in no equilibrium µ1+µ2 >
cins
h−crec is possible. The case 0 < β < 1
and µ1 + µ2 =
cins
h−crec is possible but yields a non-tracktable equilibrium that does not lead to
deeper insights for the point important in this paper.
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plying and polluting. The equilibrium sampling probability shows that the 'no
inspection equilibrium' can exist only if the probability of a correct positive re-
sult q is suﬃciently large, or if the error probability is suﬃciently small: The
right-hand side of (II.14) is smaller unity if and only if q > ccom
crec
. Therefore, for a
given quality level q, the two equilibria of 'no inspection' and 'full sampling' are
mutually exclusive.
The ﬁrm's equilibrium probability of pollution α∗ results from the citizen's
sampling condition that is the analog to (II.10). The citizen will sample if and
only if
α∗h− α∗ (1− q)h ≥ csam
or
α∗ ≥ csam
qh
(II.15)
which has to hold with equality: If α < csam
qh
(α > csam
qh
) we would get β = 0
(β = 1) violating (II.14). Thus, the equilibrium pollution probability is
α∗ =
csam
qh
. (II.16)
It remains to show under which condition the regulator indeed does not inspect
if he receives no report. According to Bayes' rule we get µ1 =
α∗β∗(1−q)
1−α∗β∗q and
µ2 =
α∗(1−β∗)
1−α∗β∗q . Substituting this into (II.12) yields
csam
qh
(
1− ccom
qcrec
q
)
1− csam
qh
ccom
qcrec
q
<
cins
h− crec
and so not inspecting is a best response if and only if inspections are suﬃciently
costly in the sense that
csam (crec − ccom)
qhcrec − csamccom (h− crec) < cins. (II.17)
To summarize, if q > ccom
crec
and if (II.17) holds the regulatory game features
a 'no inspection equilibrium' where p∗ins = 0, p
∗
inv = 1, α
∗ = csam
qh
, β∗ = ccom
qcrec
together with the resulting system of beliefs.
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9 Comparative analysis of monitoring
quality
The preceding analysis allows us to study the impact of improvements in mon-
itoring quality on the regulatory equilibrium. The improvement in monitoring
quality stems from a technological innovation. In principle innovations can lead
to higher quality, lower costs or a combination of both. In this paper we consider
innovations that exclusively bring about a higher sampling accuracy instead of
savings in sampling costs. In keeping with the model, diﬀerences in monitoring
quality then mean a better sampling technology with a reduced error probability
(1− q) while keeping csam constant.
The comparative statics ﬁrst consider how changes in q aﬀect payoﬀs in the
'no inspection equilibrium'. In this case, the "natural" intuition that employing
a better technology yields a superior outcome will hold true. We then study
the impacts of changes in q in the 'full sampling equilibrium'. In this case, the
"natural" intuition fails: Better technologies can lead to more harm and to a
decrease in welfare. We discuss this case in detail. The results are derived by
considering marginal changes in q so that q < ccom
crec
and q > ccom
crec
, respectively,
hold. For ease of comparability, we assume that a marginal change in q does not
alter the nature of the equilibrium.
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9.1 No inspection equilibrium
9.1.1 Equilibrium strategies
In this equilibrium the regulator's choices are not aﬀected by changes in q. As
in (II.14) the citizen's equilibrium strategy is β∗ = ccom
qcrec
which is decreasing in
q. The reason is that in equilibrium the citizen's frequency of sampling serves
to make the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between polluting and complying. An increase in
q, however, yields in expectation more reports and thus more investigations and
so higher expected recovery costs for the ﬁrm. Because the regulator's policy
does not change this eﬀect has to be oﬀset by a decrease in β∗. A decrease in
the sampling probability leads c.p. to a decrease in expected recovery costs. In
total the probability for the ﬁrm that it has to recover after pollution has to stay
constant. This is indeed the case because this probability is β∗q = ccom
qcrec
q = ccom
crec
which does not depend on q. The ﬁrm's equilibrium strategy decreases as well.
The polluting probability has to make the citizen indiﬀerent. His beneﬁt from
sampling is the harm he (additionally) avoids which is α∗qh. An increase in
sampling accuracy increases the harm avoided and because sampling costs do not
change the increase in the citizen's expected beneﬁt has to be oﬀset by a decrease
in the polluting probability.1
9.1.2 Equilibrium payoﬀs
Having described the changes in the 'no inspection equilibrium' strategies we now
analyze the changes in the equilibrium payoﬀs. Consider ﬁrst, the ﬁrm's payoﬀ.
This does not change because the ﬁrm has to be indiﬀerent between polluting
and complying. As complying yields −ccom this also holds in expectation if it
pollutes with a positive probability independent of q. Second, the citizen's payoﬀ
increases because expected harm decreases. This is α∗ (1− β∗)h+α∗β∗ (1− q)h.
Substituting (II.16) and (II.14) and rearranging terms shows that expected harm
is csam
q
(
1− ccom
crec
)
which is decreasing in q. This shows that in the 'no inspection
equilibrium' a better monitoring technology is associated with improved environ-
mental quality. Third, overall welfare increases: Substituting p∗ins = 0, p
∗
inv = 1,
1Formally, (II.16) gives us ∂α
∗
∂q = − csamhq2 < 0.
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(II.16) and (II.14) in (II.2) yields W = − csam
q
(
1 + cinvccom
hcrec
)
− ccom which is in-
creasing in q.
9.2 Full sampling equilibrium
The comparative analysis for the 'no inspection equilibrium' shows that improving
monitoring technologies can be desirable. In the following we show that this does
not necessarily hold.
9.2.1 Equilibrium strategies
Consider ﬁrst the ﬁrm's equilibrium strategy as stated in (II.7). The probability
that the ﬁrm pollutes increases in q because
∂α∗
∂q
=
cins (h− cins − crec)
[(1− q) (h− cins − crec) + cins]2
> 0.
If citizens employ a better monitoring technology and hence the probability that
the ﬁrm has to recover after investigations increases2 the probability that the ﬁrm
pollutes increases as well. The reason for this counterintuitive result originates
from the regulator's equilibrium belief. Suppose that the ﬁrm's equilibrium strat-
egy did not change. Then the regulator's equilibrium belief that he received no
report due to a false negative result, i.e. µ1, which is derived from the ﬁrm's strat-
egy is decreasing in q because
(
∂ α
∗(1−q)
1−α∗q
)
/∂q = −(1−α
∗)α∗
(1−α∗q)2 < 0. For any pollution
probability the probability that the assay shows a false negative result decreases
and thus the regulator adjusts his belief that this is the reason why he received no
report downwards. But in equilibrium (II.4) has to hold with equality and µ1 is a
constant independent of q. To oﬀset the decrease in α
∗(1−q)
1−α∗q due to the increase in
q the probability of pollution has to increase as ∂
(
α∗(1−q)
1−α∗q
)
/∂α∗ = 1−q
(1−α∗q)2 > 0.
Second, consider the change in the inspection probability. For the ﬁrm to
have an incentive to increase α, the probability of recovery after inspections has to
decrease because the ﬁrm faces higher expected recovery costs after investigations
2Obviously the equilibrium probability of investigations p∗inv remains unchanged.
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due to a higher q. This is indeed the case because (1− q) and the inspection
probability decrease:
∂p∗ins
∂q
=
ccom − crec
(1− q)2 crec
< 0.
From the ﬁrm's point of view the change in p∗ins or rather in (1− q) p∗ins is of
minor importance. The relevant dimension is the probability of recovery after
pollution. As the equilibrium investigation probability is one, the probability
of recovery if the assay indicates 'pollution' increases by the same amount q
increases. Now, because
∂((1−q)p∗ins)
∂q
= −1 the probability of recovery if the assay
indicates 'no pollution' decreases by the amount q increases and thus exactly
oﬀsets the ﬁrst eﬀect. The reason is the following: Suppose that the increase in q
exceeds the decrease in (1− q) p∗ins. Then, starting from a situation where the ﬁrm
is indiﬀerent between pollution and no pollution, the increase in expected recovery
costs would render not to pollute the unique best response for the ﬁrm. But
then p∗ins > 0 would no longer be a best response for the regulator contradicting
(II.9) which requires 0 < p∗ins < 1. Contrary, if the increase in q is smaller
than the decrease in (1− q) p∗ins the ﬁrm's unique best response would become
α = 1 making p∗ins = 1 a best response for the regulator which again contradicts
(II.9). So, to remain in equilibrium the probability of recovery after inspections
(1− q) p∗ins has to decrease by the same amount as the probability of recovery
after investigations q increases. Only in that case the regulator and the ﬁrm
will still choose an interior solution. Further, this result shows that the use of
a better monitoring technology allows the regulator to substitute inspections by
investigations to provide deterrence. However, without further restrictions on the
parameters, i.e. on inspection and investigation costs, nothing can be said about
the cost eﬀectiveness of this eﬀect.
9.2.2 Equilibrium payoﬀs
Having considered the changes in the equilibrium strategies we now turn to the
analysis of changes in the equilibrium payoﬀs that accrue if the employed moni-
toring technology improves.
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The ﬁrm's payoﬀ The ﬁrm's equilibrium payoﬀ does not change if q increases.
The reason is that the ﬁrm chooses an interior pollution probability. This requires
that it is indiﬀerent between the two strategies available. Because the ﬁrm gets a
payoﬀ of −ccom if it does not pollute independent of the other players' strategies
this must also be the equilibrium payoﬀ independent of q.
The regulator's payoﬀ The expression in (II.2) shows that the regulator's
payoﬀ involves six components: investigation costs, inspection costs, harm, re-
covery costs, compliance costs and sampling costs - each in its respective expected
value. Except sampling costs, which are constant, we consider these components
separately. The results are summarized in3
Proposition II.1 Increasing the accuracy of citizen monitoring in the full sam-
pling equilibrium leads to
1. higher expected investigation costs,
2. lower expected inspection costs,
3. higher expected harm,
4. higher expected recovery costs, and
5. lower expected compliance costs.
First, the proposition shows that expected investigation costs increase. Ex-
pected investigation costs are α∗qp∗invcinv, i.e. investigations are carried out when-
ever the ﬁrm polluted and the assay indeed indicated pollution. Therefore, be-
cause the investigation probability remains one, expected investigation costs are
positively aﬀected by two eﬀects. The ﬁrst is due to the increase in the pollu-
tion probability α∗ and the second stems from the higher probability of a correct
positive result q.
Second, expected inspection costs decrease. They are (1− α∗q) p∗inscins and
are carried out whenever the sample does not indicate pollution. It does not
indicate pollution in two situations. One where the ﬁrm does not pollute and the
3The formal proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
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other where the ﬁrm pollutes but the assay indicates no pollution. The probability
that one of the two situations occurs is 1 − α∗q. As both α∗ and q increase this
probability decreases. Further, the equilibrium inspection probability p∗ins gets
smaller as well. Thus, the probability that the regulator carries out inspections
decreases and so do expected inspection costs.
Third - and most remarkable - expected harm increases. The previous sec-
tion already demonstrated that a lower error probability leads to more pollution.
However, the relevant factor is not pollution but harm, or more precisely the harm
that is not recovered after pollution. An increase in the probability of pollution
would not worsen environmental quality if the additive pollution would get recov-
ered or the ﬁrm would even have to recover more than the additional pollution.
Nonetheless, in the set-up considered here this is not the case. Here, a better
monitoring technology unambiguously leads to more expected harm. Expected
harm is α∗ (1− q) (1− p∗ins)h and occurs whenever the ﬁrm pollutes but is not
forced to recover. Because recovery is always ruled if the assay shows a positive
result the only situation where recovery is not ruled is whenever the ﬁrm pol-
lutes, the assay shows a false negative result and the regulator does not inspect.
Rewriting expected harm yields α∗ {(1− q)− (1− q) p∗ins}h. Diﬀerentiating this
w.r.t. q yields
∂α∗
∂q
{(1− q)− (1− q) p∗ins}h+ α∗
−∂q∂q − ∂ [(1− q) p∗ins]∂q︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
h =
∂α∗
∂q
{(1− q)− (1− q) p∗ins}h > 0.
This shows that a change in q aﬀects expected harm in two respects. The ﬁrst
is the eﬀect of the pollution probability α∗ which increases. The second eﬀect
is due to the changes in the probability that the ﬁrm is not forced to recover.
This is the case whenever the assay does not indicate pollution (with probabil-
ity 1 − q) except when the regulator inspects conditional that no pollution was
indicated (with probability (1− q) p∗ins). The probability that the assay falsely
indicates no pollution decreases which c.p. leads proportionally to more recovery.
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However, the eﬀect on the conditional probability (1− q) p∗ins counteracts the for-
mer. Now, because ∂ [(1− q) p∗ins] /∂q = −1 the latter eﬀect exactly oﬀsets the
former.4 Therefore, the only eﬀect that remains active is the change in the pol-
lution probability which increases. Although the probability that pollution gets
recovered remains unchanged expected harm increases becauses the probability
of pollution increases.
Fourth, expected recovery costs increase. Recall that expected recovery costs
are given by α∗ [q + (1− q) p∗ins] crec, so the ﬁrm incurs recovery costs whenever
it pollutes and either the assay indicates pollution or if the assay indicates no
pollution but the regulator inspects. Expected recovery costs are aﬀected by the
increase in the probability of pollution and by the change in the probability of
enforcement actions if the ﬁrm polluted. The ﬁrst eﬀect leads c.p. to an increase
in expected recovery costs. As previously shown the probability of enforcement
actions remains unchanged so that in total expected recovery costs increase.
Fifth, expected compliance costs decrease. This must hold because the ﬁrm's
equilibrium payoﬀ does not change if q changes and as expected recovery costs
increase the other payoﬀ component has to decrease in its expected value. Ex-
pected compliance costs are (1− α∗) ccom and as α∗ increases the probability of
compliance decreases.
The citizen's payoﬀ The citizen's equilibrium payoﬀ decreases. It is aﬀected
by expected harm and sampling costs and is −α∗ (1− q) (1− p∗ins)h − csam. As
the proposition shows, expected harm increases. Therefore, as sampling costs are
constant the citizen has a lower payoﬀ in the new equilibrium.
4See the previous section for the reason why the second eﬀect exactly oﬀsets the ﬁrst.
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10 Discussion of part II
The key result of the paper is that an increased probability that citizen moni-
toring will successfully detect pollution is not necessarily associated with lower
pollution, higher welfare overall, and higher welfare for citizens. The result calls
for a careful assessment of the strategic situation in which ﬁrms, citizens, and
regulators operate before advocating ostensibly sensible, but possibly problem-
atic policy advice. In the following, we ﬁrst identify how this result adds to the
current body of knowledge. We then discuss the potential consequences of relax-
ing a few of the model's assumptions to understand more about the robustness
of the ﬁndings.
10.1 Contribution to the existing literature
As the introduction makes clear, the literature on private inputs into regulatory
monitoring and enforcement processes considers similar questions as the present
paper. It is natural, therefore, that there are important similarities, but also
important diﬀerences between the present paper and previous work on citizen
participation at the monitoring stage and on citizen participation at the enforce-
ment stage.
Papers on private participation at the enforcement stage obviously examine
a diﬀerent step in the overall process, but contain comparable results: Theoret-
ically, Heyes and Rickman (1999), Langpap (2007), and Heyes (1998) show that
private enforcement can have crowding eﬀects on regulatory monitoring and en-
forcement. Empirically, the early analysis by Naysnerski and Tietenberg (1992)
suggests that private and public enforcement are inversely related. The study con-
ducted by Langpap and Shimshack (2010) ﬁnds that private enforcement leads
67
to a crowding-in of regulatory monitoring whereas it crowds-out regulatory sanc-
tioning.
Previous work on private participation at the monitoring stage contains re-
sults of a comparable nature, but diﬀers in modeling assumptions and mecha-
nisms. Heyes' (2002) theory of "ﬁltered enforcement" analyzes a two-stage pro-
cess of emissions monitoring and enforcement, with a noisy ﬁrst stage signal of
the appropriate strength triggering enforcement. The ﬁrst-stage signal can be in-
terpreted as citizens' propensity to report. Heyes shows that a better signal has
a qualitatively ambiguous eﬀect on overall emissions because a better signal can
lower the probability of second stage enforcement. Despite the superﬁcial simi-
larity, the mechanisms at work diﬀer between the two papers. First, if the trigger
is interpreted as the complaint propensity, citizens' monitoring activity in Heyes
(2002) is given and not endogenous, in contrast to the present model. Secondly,
in ﬁltered enforcement, polluters are only sanctioned - in terms of our model -
after investigations. A better signal then crowds out the regulator's propensity
to investigate reports. By contrast, in our model the regulator investigates ev-
ery report and it is the increase in reports that crowds out inspections that are
conditional on 'no report.'
A similar diﬀerence occurs between our setting and the one analyzed by
Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2010). In a crime context they consider a sit-
uation of peer monitoring between two groups and subsequent reports to the
police. In this context, false positive reports are important. If two groups have
diﬀerent abilities to assess whether an observation indeed is based on an illegal
act, the police responds to the larger bias in reporting by lowering investigations
conditional on reports. By contrast, the regulator in our model substitutes own
inspections through more (and more accurate) reports.
Finally, Garoupa (2001) focuses on the crowding-in of investigations due to
reporting. There, subsidizing reports - and thus more reporting - is always bene-
ﬁcial because in the absence of reporting, expected punishment for perpetrators
is assumed to be negligible. Again, the models and mechanisms diﬀer. Whereas
in the present model the possibility of avoiding harm provides an incentive for
citizens to report, there, victims only report if they are compensated. Second,
victims possess a perfect monitoring technology, while the technology is imper-
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fect in the present paper. Third, and most important, the regulator's strategy
set diﬀers. In Garoupa (2001), the regulator jointly determines both probabili-
ties of sanctioning conditional on a report and conditional on no report using a
single measure, namely enforcement expenditure. As a consequence, when ﬁxing
enforcement expenditure the regulator pushes both probabilities into the same
direction. Our model diﬀers in that the regulator can set the inspection and
the investigation probability independently, allowing both to move into the same
direction or - as is important for our results - to diverge.
To summarize the contribution of the present analysis is threefold: First, it
is the ﬁrst model to our knowledge that explicitly takes imperfections in citizens'
monitoring technology into account and analyzes the consequences that arise if
better technologies become available. Second, it considers the subtle relationship
between citizens' incentives to report infractions and regulatory investigations
and inspections in a game theoretic setup. Third, the paper demonstrates a
novel mechanism by which citizen monitoring and reporting can have undesirable
and unexpected crowding eﬀects.
10.2 Relaxing assumptions
How robust is the result to changes in some modeling assumptions? First, we
assumed that the citizen does not tell the regulator whether he sampled when
the assay indicates 'no pollution.' Deviating from this assumption does not nec-
essarily alter the results, but involves a diﬀerent structure of information sets.
Alongside the regulator's single-node information set where the assay indicated
'pollution', two other sets would emerge. One contains the two nodes where the
sample correctly or falsely indicates 'no pollution'. say Hs, and the other con-
tains the two nodes where the regulator knows that the sample was not taken,
say Hns. At Hns the regulator would have to decide whether to inspect as well,
adding a new variable, say pˆins. Focussing on equilibria with β = 1 means that
Hns would not be reached in equilibrium and p
∗
ins - the equilibrium choice at Hs
- as well as α∗ would remain unchanged. Whether this is an equilibrium depends
on the restrictions one puts on beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path and the (resulting)
regulator's belief at Hns. Given this belief pˆins must be sequential rational for
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the regulator and at the same time be suﬃciently small for β = 1 still be a best
response.
Second, we assumed that the citizen does not lie, i.e. he truthfully reveals
whether the assay indicated 'pollution'. This assumption, while capturing the
main focus of the literature on citizen monitoring, may not be reasonable. Given
the possibility of false negative samples, the citizen cannot be sure to suﬀer no
harm if the assay indicates 'no pollution'. This provides an incentive for wrong-
fully reporting 'pollution'.1 However, one can justify the truth-telling assumption
on two grounds. On the one hand, note that the regulator investigates reports.
Because we abstract from false positive results the regulator knows that the citi-
zen lied if he reported pollution but investigations reveal the opposite allowing to
ﬁne wrongful reports. If the ﬁne was suﬃciently large the citizen would not lie.
On the other hand, the one-shot game analyzed can be considered to be a snap-
shot of a repeated interaction. The possibility to lie can then have several eﬀects
that give the citizen an incentive to tell the truth. The regulator might react to
the possibility of lies by choosing a smaller investigation probability leading to
more pollution as well as to less recovery both causing more harm. Moreover, in
a repeated interaction the regulator might stick to strategies that initially feature
investigations with probability one but where he refuses to investigate (at least
for some time) if the citizen failed to tell the truth.
1See also Takáts (2009) who considers excessive reporting in the context of money laundering.
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11 Conclusion of part II
As the paper substantiates, the intuition that a higher monitoring quality in
citizen monitoring programs is naturally associated with more compliance, less
harm, and higher welfare for the concerned population may not hold. Instead,
enhancing the citizen's ability to infer whether a ﬁrm polluted can worsen en-
vironmental quality. This holds even in a situation where a better monitoring
technology can be applied without higher costs. The reason is the counterintuitive
result that such an improved technology can lead to more harm caused by pollu-
tion. Nevertheless, the proposition shows that employing a better technology can
be desirable even if its adoption is accompanied by lower environmental quality.
This would be the case if the savings in expected inspection and compliance costs
outweigh the aggregate increase in the other elements of the regulator's objective,
i.e. expected harm, expected recovery and expected investigation costs.
One important implication and future area of research is the relationship
between progress in monitoring quality, e.g. through technological innovations,
and the incentives to adopt. Suppose that a better monitoring technology would
be associated with higher welfare so that its adoption is desirable from society's
point of view. The problem is then that it is not the regulator but the citizen
who uses the monitoring device. Although it is beneﬁcial for the citizen to use
some monitoring device he is not indiﬀerent between monitoring technologies
with diﬀering error probabilities. In the full sampling equilibrium expected harm
increases if the error probability gets smaller. Thus, the citizen is worse oﬀ if he
uses a better monitoring device. If the citizen then could choose a device he would
choose one with a high error probability (assuming that one with q > ccom
crec
is not
available). This raises the question how the better technology can be employed
if desirable. Such an analysis should also take into account that there might be a
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relationship between the citizen's monitoring accuracy and sampling costs. The
citizen then can have an additional choice variable, i.e. he can choose how much
to spend on sampling and thereby determine the error probability.
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Part III
Criminalizing Environmental
Oﬀences: When The Prosecutor's
Helping Hand Hurts
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12 Introduction to part III
Environmental regulation in Europe has changed substantially in the last years.
Two trends that received considerable attention stand out. The ﬁrst trend is the
mobilization of the apparatus of criminal prosecution in pursuit of environmen-
tal oﬀenders. The second trend is the increasing reliance on self-reporting by
polluters.
In contrast to standard regulatory procedures, criminal prosecution provides
access to the full sanctioning regime of criminal law. German environmental law
takes a particularly prominent role in this context. In the European Union this
trend resulted in the EU directive 2008/99/EC 'on the protection of the envi-
ronment through criminal law '. The economic intuition guiding this procedure
stems from the standard model of crime and punishment (Becker 1968)1: Risk-
neutral, rational agents will commit an oﬀence if and only if the beneﬁts exceed
the expected punishment. Therefore, increasing punishment, imposed at rela-
tively low costs, allows to substitute relatively costly inspections without diluting
deterrence. Similarly, if the end is to improve environmental quality, increasing
punishment for environmentally harmful activities - while keeping the probability
of conviction constant - reduces the attractiveness of oﬀences and yields fewer vi-
olations and thus less harm. The economic literature on crime has demonstrated
that there is a variety of good reasons for being skeptical about the universal
beneﬁts of tighter sanctions (e.g. Stigler 1970, Andreoni 1991, Heyes 1996)2.
1See Posner (1985), Fenn and Veljanovski (1988), Ogus and Abbot (2002), Faure and Visser
(2004), Bowles et al. (2008), and Faure et al. (2009) for a discussion of criteria that help to
assess the relative (dis-) advantages of the criminal law versus other means to controll harmful
activities and / or enforce norms, e.g. tort law, administrative proceedings, and taxes.
Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar (2004) argue that there are circumstances where it is optimal to
use criminal sanctions additionally to regulatory ﬁnes.
2See also Garoupa (1997) for a survey.
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What the literature has not suﬃciently considered, however, is that drawing up
particular statutes that specify the criminal act and the tariﬀs this act attracts
is only one of two building blocks required when introducing criminal sanctions.
The other is institutional and arises from the speciﬁc prosecutorial and judicial
mandates that are enshrined in laws and norms set outside the realm of envi-
ronmental enforcement. On the one hand, codes of criminal procedure in many
EU states rule that prosecutors have to follow the legality principle. This re-
quires prosecuting every (potential) crime that comes within their competence
- in contrast to the opportunity principle that hands the prosecutor discretion
over whether to pursue a crime or not. On the other hand, when deciding which
penalty to impose on convicted perpetrators courts cannot and do not exclusively
rely on incentive considerations and economic reasoning. Sentencing also follows
e.g. minimum and maximum penalties for certain acts, attitudes of justice and
fairness, size of sanctions for other acts than those being environmentally harmful,
and even sometimes the judge's personal preferences.3
The second trend is the increasing reliance on self-reporting. In many coun-
tries carrying out self-monitoring is mandatory (Farmer 2007). A growing number
of legislations prescribe ﬁrms to report (accidental) emissions to regulatory au-
thorities. National 'Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers' and its European
counterpart (E-PRTR) that followed the less comprehensive 'European Pollutant
Emission Register' (EPER) are illustrative. Previous works have identiﬁed sev-
eral beneﬁts arising from self-reporting. Potential beneﬁts from self-reporting can
be lower enforcement and risk bearing costs (Kaplow and Shavell 1994), lower in-
spection costs (Malik 1993), remediation beneﬁts due to e.g. clean-up of contami-
nated sites (Innes 1999), harsher sentences for those not reporting (Innes 1999 and
similar Livernois and McKenna 1999), correction of overdeterrence (Innes 2000),
avoiding avoidance activities (Innes 2001), and a higher probability of successful
citizen suits (Langpap 2008).
In this paper we jointly analyze both trends in a single model. We show that
there are circumstances in which criminalizing environmental oﬀences retracts
the beneﬁts from self-reporting. The simple model features a single ﬁrm and a
3See for example Easterbrook (1983) and Schulhofer (1988) who - among many others -
debate whether prosecutorial and sentencing discretion can promote eﬃciency.
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regulator. The ﬁrm undertakes a risky activity that might lead to an accident
causing environmental harm. By excerting care it can inﬂuence the probability
that such an accident occurs. The regulator's mandate is to 'care about the
environment', i.e. his objective is to minimize expected environmental damages.
In doing so he chooses a regulatory policy that consists of (i) the probability of
inspection, (ii) a ﬁne for the ﬁrm if it does not report an accident, and (iii) a
ﬁne for a truthfully reported accident. Additionally, the regulator orders clean-
up that removes damages except an unrecoverable fraction. An unconstrained
regulator could minimize expected damages simply by setting all three variables
to their respective maximum. The model focuses on the more interesting and
realistic case of a budget-constrained regulator. In terms of the gains from self-
reporting the model sets remediation beneﬁts center stage as they are closest
to the harm minimizing motive. A constrained budget means that permanent
inspections are not feasible. This in turn implies that the ﬁrm's ﬁne in case of
an accident - whether reported or not - is less than maximal and so is the care
excerted. Raising penalties by imposing criminal sanctions, therefore, should
lead to an increase in environmental quality. This paper shows that this intuitive
conclusion does not necessarily hold if the institutional framework leads to less
self-reporting.
If environmental oﬀences are not subject to criminal sanctions, it is optimal
- in terms of environmental quality - that a budget constrained regulator incen-
tivizes the ﬁrm to report. This is because the ﬁne for a reported accident is the
same as the expected ﬁne in case of no report (Innes 1999) yielding identical
levels of care. However, a report implies certain clean-up contrary to uncertain
recovery if the ﬁrm does not report. The regulator ﬁne-tunes his policy so that
the ﬁrm has an incentive to report an accident. This already points to the reason
why adding the prosecutorial and judicial system to environmental regulation
can dilute the incentives to self-report. Prosecutors as well as courts are bounded
by procedural and sentencing rules and may disable the regulator's ability to
ﬁne-tune his policy. The criminal system provides harsher penalties. The ﬁrm's
incentives, however, are determined by the absolute levels of penalties but also by
the diﬀerence in the (expected) penalties for a reported and unreported accident.
On the one hand, the level of care depends on the (expected) penalty. On the
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other hand, the reporting decision depends upon the diﬀerence between the cer-
tain ﬁne after a report and the expected ﬁne for not reporting. The institutional
limitations that accompany the judicial system can prevent a policy that causes
the ﬁrm to report, thus removing remediation beneﬁts.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the basic model.
Section 14 compares reporting and no reporting without criminalization and sec-
tion 15 adds the prosecutor. The results are compared in section 16. Section 17
concludes.
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13 The basic model
The basic model considers a risk-neutral ﬁrm and an environmental agency, hence-
forth the regulator. The ﬁrm undertakes a risky activity that might lead to an
accident causing damages d. By spending an amount of x on excerting precau-
tionary eﬀort the ﬁrm can inﬂuence the probability that an accident occurs. This
probability is σ (x) with σx (x) < 0, σxx (x) > 0. The ﬁrm perfectly observes
whether an accident happened. In case of an accident it can report it to the
regulator.
The regulator cannot observe the ﬁrm's exerted care. However, by conducting
costly monitoring in the absence of a report the regulator can identify whether
an accident happened. The regulator is budget constrained, i.e. b < µ where b
is the regulator's budget and µ are the costs of 24/7 monitoring. In the basic
model the regulator has three policy variables at hand: ﬁrst, he chooses to inspect
with frequency p if the ﬁrm does not report an accident. Second, he imposes a
ﬁne if the ﬁrm reports an accident and, third, imposes a potentially diﬀering ﬁne
if the ﬁrm does not report but inspections reveal that an accident happened.
Imposing ﬁnes is costless. Additionally to paying a ﬁne, the ﬁrm is forced to
recover damages of an accident at its own expense, independent of whether a
report or inspections reveal that the accident happened. The costs of recovery are
the same independent of whether it is ordered after a report or after inspections.
Denote the ﬁrm's total cost after an accident in case it reports f1 and f2 in case
of inspections. These two measures include the respective ﬁne as well as recovery
costs. As recovery costs are exogenous and the same in both situations we can
treat f1 and f2 to be directly under the regulator's control and term them ﬁnes in
the following. Both ﬁnes cannot be arbitrarily large, i.e. fi ≤ f¯i i = 1, 2, where
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f¯i is the respective largest possible ﬁne the regulator can impose.
1 Recovery
eliminates damages except a fraction of δ.
The ﬁrm's objective is to minimize costs. If the ﬁrm reports an accident these
costs Cr are
Cr = x+ σ (x) f1. (III.1)
If instead it does not report an accident its costs Cnr are
Cnr = x+ σ (x) pf2. (III.2)
Independent of whether an accident happens the ﬁrm incurs the costs of excerting
care. Additionally, if an accident happens it either pays the certain ﬁne f1 if it
does report or the expected ﬁne pf2 if it does not.
Following e.g. Garvie and Keeler (1994) and Heyes and Rickman (1999) we
assume that the regulator's objective is to minimize expected damages.2 If the
ﬁrm reports these damages are Dr:
Dr = σ (x) δd. (III.3)
If an accident happens and the ﬁrm reports the regulator suﬀers unrecoverable
damages δd. If instead the ﬁrm does not report damages Dnr are
Dnr = σ (x) [(1− p) d+ pδd] (III.4)
= σ (x) [1− (1− δ) p] d.
If the accident is not reported the regulator suﬀers total damages if he does not
1The maximum feasible ﬁne can for instance be deﬁned by the legal framework. Alterna-
tively, both ﬁnes can be constrained by the ﬁrm's assets w. In that case necessarily f¯1 = f¯2 = w.
However, we do not restrict the analysis to the special case where f¯1 = f¯2.
2It is well understood that in many countries the mandate of environmental agencies is
environmental protection (Farmer 2007). Others assuming that the regulator's objective is
to minimize harm (or maximize environmental quality) are e.g. Heyes (1996), Hansen et al.
(2006), and Jost (1997a). Jones and Scotchmer (1990) consider the case of an agency whose
goal is to maximize beneﬁts of compliance and analyze the resulting impacts on the budget
setting process.
See Heyes and Kapur (2009b) and Keeler (1995) for discussions of diﬀerent regulatory ob-
jectives. Firestone (2002) ﬁnds empirical support for harm minimizing regulators. See also
Firestone (2003) for a discussion of how the EPA would operate under certain motivations.
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inspect and unrecoverable damages only if he inspects. Stated diﬀerently, the
second line in (III.4) says that the regulator suﬀers damages except the fraction
that is recovered (1− δ) if he inspects. Having described the basic model we now
derive the ﬁrm's choice and the optimal policy.
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14 Monitoring and enforcement without
the prosecutor
Before we analyze the impact of adding the prosecutorial system to the regulation
of harmful activities by a budget constrained regulator we derive the optimal
policy in the absence of the prosecutor. This serves as a benchmark for comparing
criminalization with sole regulatory monitoring and enforcement. The analysis
shows that the optimal policy depends on the relative size between the maximum
ﬁne in case the ﬁrm reports f¯1 and the maximum feasible expected ﬁne if the ﬁrm
does not report b
µ
f¯2.
The model involves two stages. At the ﬁrst stage the regulator speciﬁes a
policy {p, f1, f2}1 whereas at the second stage the ﬁrm chooses the level of care
and whether to report an accident. The regulatory policy can incentivize the
ﬁrm to report or not. When solving the model we diﬀerentiate according to the
reporting decision the policy induces. For both cases we ﬁrst analyze the ﬁrm's
decision about the optimal level of care given the optimal policy. Thereafter, we
derive the optimal policy that induces the ﬁrm's optimal level of care. Having
derived both policies - the one that optimally induces reporting and the one
that optimally does not - we compare both outcomes and analyze which case
the regulator prefers and thus implements. Optimal choices are marked by an
asterisk.
1Denoted {pr, f1,r, f2,r} if it induces the ﬁrm to report and {pnr, f1,nr, f2,nr} if not.
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14.1 Policy with reporting
Suppose that the regulator set the optimal policy
{
p∗r, f
∗
1,r, f
∗
2,r
}
that induces the
ﬁrm to report an accident. This must satisfy
f ∗1,r ≤ p∗rf ∗2,r (III.5)
for reporting to be superior compared to not reporting. If (III.5) is satisﬁed the
ﬁrm's optimization problem is
min
x
x+ σ (x) f ∗1,r.
The FOC
1 + σx (x
∗
r) f
∗
1,r = 0 (III.6)
deﬁnes the optimal choice x∗r = x
∗
r
(
f ∗1,r
)
with dx
∗
r
df1,r
> 0.2 If the ﬁne f ∗1,r increases
the optimal level of care increases because the marginal beneﬁts in terms of the
penalty avoided increase as well.
Given the ﬁrm's reaction function x∗r the regulator's optimization problem is
min
pr,f1,r,f2,r
σ (x∗r) δd
s.t.
prµ ≤ b
f1,r ≤ f¯1
f2,r ≤ f¯2
1 + σx (x
∗
r) f1,r = 0
f1,r ≤ prf2,r.
The ﬁrst constraint is the regulator's budget constraint, the second and third are
the restrictions on the implementable ﬁnes, the fourth deﬁnes the ﬁrm's reaction
function and the last constraint is the reporting condition. The objective implies
2This can easily be veriﬁed by applying the total diﬀerential on the FOC.
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that the regulator wants the level of care x∗r to be as large as possible to miminize
the probability of an accident. As the level of care is increasing in f1,r this ﬁne
has to be as large as possible as well. The reporting condition calls for a discount
on the ﬁne after a report f1,r as this is imposed with certainty compared to the
ﬁne for not reporting f2,r which is imposed only when the ﬁrm is inspected. Two
situations are possible: First, the maximum ﬁne for a reported accident f¯1 is small
in the sense that b
µ
f¯2 ≥ f¯1. In that case setting f1,r to its maximum, i.e. f ∗1,r = f¯1,
is possible because the regulator is able to set the expected ﬁne for not reporting
above this level. The optimal inspection frequency p∗r and the optimal ﬁne f
∗
2,r
have to fulﬁll the reporting condition and w.l.o.g. we set p∗r =
b
µ
and f ∗2,r = f¯2.
Second, if f¯1 is relatively large in the sense that
b
µ
f¯2 < f¯1 the regulator cannot
fully exploit the deterrence power of f1,r. He has to oﬀer the ﬁrm a discount in
the ﬁne for reporting because f¯2 and the budget b prevent to raise the expected
ﬁne for not reporting above f 1. The optimal policy sets the expected ﬁne for
not reporting to its maximum and sets the highest f1 that fulﬁlls the reporting
condition, i.e. p∗r =
b
µ
, f ∗1,r =
b
µ
f¯2, f
∗
2,r = f¯2.
3 We summarize this in
Proposition III.1 The optimal regulatory policy that lets the ﬁrm report an ac-
cident is {
p∗r, f
∗
1,r, f
∗
2,r
}
=

{
b
µ
, f¯1, f¯2
}
if b
µ
f¯2 ≥ f¯1{
b
µ
, b
µ
f¯2, f¯2
}
if b
µ
f¯2 < f¯1
.
Having derived the optimal poliy inducing reporting we now turn to the case
where the ﬁrm does not report.
3In this second case where bµ f¯2 − f¯1 < 0 the actual ﬁne imposed in case of a report can
be negative. To see this, recall that the measures f1 and f2 do not only entail the penalty
for an accident but also recovery costs. Denote the actual penalties f ′1 and f
′
2 respectively
and recovery costs k. The (binding) reporting condition then is f ′1 + k =
b
µ
(
f¯ ′2 + k
)
so that
the penalty actually imposed for a reported accident is f ′1 =
b
µ
(
f¯ ′2 + k
) − k which, for small
budgets, can be negative. Therefore, if b is small, the regulator would have to pay a subsidy
to a reporting ﬁrm which would further reduce the regulator's budget available for inspections.
In the following, we abstract from the possibility that imposed ﬁnes can be negative, i.e. we
assume that the regulator's budget is suﬃciently large.
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14.2 Policy without reporting
Having described how to optimally incentivize the ﬁrm to report an accident we
now turn to the case where the ﬁrm does not report. The ﬁrm will not report
an accident if and only if the policy
{
p∗nr, f
∗
1,nr, f
∗
2,nr
}
satisﬁes the no reporting
condition
f ∗1,nr > p
∗
nrf
∗
2,nr. (III.7)
Given this, the ﬁrm's optimization problem is
min
x
x+ σ (x) p∗nrf
∗
2,nr
and the FOC deﬁnes its optimal choice x∗nr:
1 + σx (x
∗
nr) p
∗
nrf
∗
2,nr = 0. (III.8)
Then x∗nr = x
∗
nr
(
p∗nr, f
∗
2,nr
)
with dx
∗
nr
dp∗nr
, dx
∗
nr
df∗2,nr
> 0.
Given this reaction function x∗nr the regulator's problem becomes
min
pnr,f1,nr,f2,nr
σ (x∗nr) [1− (1− δ) pnr] d
s.t.
pnrµ ≤ b
f1,nr ≤ f¯1
f2,nr ≤ f¯2
1 + σx (x
∗
nr) pnrf2,nr = 0
f1,nr > pnrf2,nr
The objective requires the level of care to be as large as possible. Again, two
situations can occur. First, f¯1 is large, i.e.
b
µ
f¯2 < f¯1. The regulator then sets
p∗nr =
b
µ
as this (i) maximizes the level of care and (ii) minimizes damages that
are not recovered. Additionally, he sets f ∗2,nr = f¯2 to maximize the level of
care. The no reporting condition requires f ∗1,nr >
b
µ
f¯2 and we set f
∗
1,nr = f¯1.
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Second, if instead f¯1 is small, i.e.
b
µ
f¯2 ≥ f¯1, it is not possible to set pf2,nr to
its maximum because otherwise the maximum ﬁne for a reported accident is too
small to prevent reporting. The expected ﬁne, while respecting the no reporting
condition, is maximized by setting f ∗1,nr = f¯1, p
∗
nr =
b
µ
, f ∗2,nr =
µ
b
f¯1 − η with η
arbitrarily close to zero.4
Thus, we get
Proposition III.2 The optimal regulatory policy that lets the ﬁrm not report an
accident is
{
p∗nr, f
∗
1,nr, f
∗
2,nr
}
=

{
b
µ
, f¯1,
µ
b
f¯1 − η
}
with η arbitrarily close to zero if b
µ
f¯2 ≥ f¯1{
b
µ
, f¯1, f¯2
}
if b
µ
f¯2 < f¯1
.
14.3 Reporting versus no reporting
Given the optimal reporting and no reporting policies, we can now determine
when the regulator prefers that the ﬁrm reports an accident. We have to consider
two cases. One where f¯1 ≤ bµ f¯2 and one where f¯1 > bµ f¯2.
Small f¯1 We ﬁrst consider the case where f¯1 is small, i.e.
b
µ
f¯2 ≥ f¯1. The ﬁrm's
level of care if the policy makes the ﬁrm report an accident x∗r is given by
1 + σx (x
∗
r) f¯1 = 0
whereas the no reporting level x∗nr is deﬁned by
1 + σx (x
∗
nr)
b
µ
(µ
b
f¯1 − η
)
= 0⇔
1 + σx (x
∗
nr) f¯1 −
b
µ
η = 0
4Depending on the parameters it could also be that p∗nr <
b
µ . However, optimality requires
that in the limit the expected penalty for not reporting equals f¯1 (independent of the precise
values for p∗nr and f
∗
2,nr). Thus, in the limit x
∗
r = x
∗
nr. Below it is shown that this is suﬃcient
for the main result to hold.
85
with η arbitrarily close to zero, so that the ﬁrm excerts insigniﬁcant more care if
the regulator chooses the reporting policy. The reason why the levels of care are
virtually the same in both situations is the following: In both cases the regulator
sets the (expected) penalty to its feasible maximum as this yields the highest
level of care. The reporting policy features f¯1. Under the no reporting policy the
expected penalty for an accident not reported has to be as close as possible to
f¯1. Thus, in the limit the expected ﬁne for not reporting equals the ﬁne in case
of a report and the respective levels of care are the same.
Denote the diﬀerence between the outcomes if x = x∗r and x = x
∗
nr as
∆ (x∗r, x
∗
nr) so that if ∆ (x
∗
r, x
∗
nr) < 0 the regulator prefers that the ﬁrm reports
and vice versa. We get
∆ (x∗r, x
∗
nr) = σ (x
∗
r) δd− σ (x∗nr) [1− (1− δ) p∗nr] d
x∗nr−>x∗r→ σ (x∗r)
{
δ − 1 + (1− δ) b
µ
}
d
= σ (x∗r) (1− δ)
(
b
µ
− 1
)
d < 0.
Thus, if b
µ
f¯2 ≥ f¯1 the regulator implements the reporting policy. The reason is
that the level of care is virtually the same but in case of reporting the regulator
realizes remediation beneﬁts with certainty whereas in the opposite case these
beneﬁts are only realized with a probability smaller than one.5
Large f¯1 Second, consider the case where f¯1 is large, i.e.
b
µ
f¯2 < f¯1. The two
levels of care x∗r and x
∗
nr are deﬁned by
1 + σx (x
∗
r)
b
µ
f¯2 = 0
and
1 + σx (x
∗
nr)
b
µ
f¯2 = 0
5The second part of this argument was ﬁrst made by Innes (1999). In his setup, the optimal
levels of care diﬀer between a reporting and a no reporting regime. The reason is that Innes
assumes that the regulator maximizes welfare thus also taking enforcement expenditures and
costs of care into account.
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respectively, so x∗r = x
∗
nr. The relative advantage for the regulator of inducing
reports ∆ (x∗r, x
∗
nr) is then
∆ (x∗r, x
∗
nr) = σ (x
∗
r) δd− σ (x∗nr) [1− (1− δ) p∗nr] d
x∗r=x∗nr= σ (x∗r)
{
δ − 1 + (1− δ) b
µ
}
d
= σ (x∗r) (1− δ)
(
b
µ
− 1
)
d < 0.
Therefore, if b
µ
f¯2 < f¯1 the regulator implements the reporting policy as well. The
reason is the same as in the case where f¯1 is small: The levels of care are the
same but reporting yields remediation beneﬁts with certainty. So we have
Proposition III.3 A policy that incentivizes the ﬁrm to report accidents mini-
mizes environmental damages.6
6Taking into account punishment costs but neglecting remediation beneﬁts, Malik (1993)
shows that a reporting regime is not necessarily welfare enhancing. The reason is that on the
one hand the ﬁrm is inspected less often but on the other hand penalties are imposed more
often. Whether reporting is desirable then depends on, among other factors, on the relative
costs of inspections and punishment.
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15 Monitoring and enforcement with the
prosecutor
In the previous section we demonstrated that a budget-constrained regulator
whose objective is to minimize environmental damages prefers a policy where
accidents are reported. This holds independently of the relative size of the max-
imum (expected) ﬁnes the regulator can impose.
In this section we assume that another enforcement authority complements
the regulatory process. This is not an environmental agency but rather a "pure"
enforcement authority. The task of this agency is to pursue and punish violators.
The examples we have in mind are EU countries being obliged to implement a
system of criminal santions for environmental oﬀences.1 In Germany, for instance,
several agencies ('Gewerbeaufsichtsämter', 'Genehmigungsdirektionen' etc) are
(among other things) responsible for environmental quality. On the other hand,
public prosecutors are responsible for criminal proceedings and are operating
under the so called legality principle ( 152 (2), German Criminal Procedure
Order). Fisher (2009) explains this concept for Germany as follows:
"The [State Attorney's Oﬃce] is obliged to intervene [..] with regard
to all [criminal oﬀences] capable of prosecution, so far as (suﬃcient
factual clues) exist (the so-called Legalitätsgrundsatz (legality princi-
ple), as opposed to the [..] opportunity principle, whereby, in certain
cases the [State Attorney's Oﬃce] has a discretion not to pursue the
matter."
The legality principle says that the police and prosecutors are compelled to
1EU directive 2008/99/EC from December 6th, 2008.
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pursue any potential violation they get informed about.2 The public prosecutor
then accuses potential perpetrators in court which then, in case the court ﬁnds
the violator being guilty, imposes sanctions. Other countries' Criminal Procedure
Orders contain similar features. Examples are Austria ( 34, Austrian Criminal
Procedure Order), Switzerland (Art. 7, Swiss Criminal Procedure Order) and
other civil law countries. The pattern of the legality principle is similar in these
countries. However, they diﬀer in the relative importance of the legality principle
compared to the opposing opportunity principle.3 In common law countries the
legality principle is rather unknown or at least of minor importance. There, public
prosecutors and often also the police have a high degree of discretionary power
when deciding whether to prosecute a certain case.
In terms of our model criminalizing environmental oﬀences in combination
with the legality principle means that the regulator - who is not authorized to
prosecute and to impose criminal sanctions - reports any violation he gets in-
formed about to the prosecutor.4 The prosecutor then brings the case to court.
We assume that the resulting ﬁnes are exogenous and not (necessarily) based on
incentive compatibility considerations with respect to a ﬁrm's reporting behavior.
2This meaning of the term "legality principle" must not be mixed up with the principle
"nulla poena sine lege" which is the principle of legality but sometimes is also called legality
principle.
3For a more detailed description of the legality and the opportunity principle in Germany
see e.g. Kühne (2010, 198-201) and Weigend (1978).
4We assume that the regulator reports every accident to the prosecutor. This assumption
can be justiﬁed on two grounds: First, this assumption follows the theoretical logic inherent in
the criminalization of certain acts. Allowing the imposition of criminal sanctions is meaningless
if those who are responsible for doing so are virtually never informed about a crime. Second,
we demonstrate below that criminalization might lead to undesirable eﬀects in terms of more
damages. This raises the question why a regulator responsible for environmental quality will
ever report violations to the prosecutor. Nevertheless, we assume that he does so because
in the 'backround' an incentive mechanism is at work that induces the regulator to pass his
information over to the prosecutor (see the huge delegation literature for discussions about how
to control agency behavior, e.g. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, Weingast 1984, McCubbins et
al. 1987, 1989, Calvert et al. 1989).
In fact, there is evidence that regulators are aware that imposing criminal sanctions can
have negative eﬀects. As regulators mostly follow a prospective approach they are more inter-
ested in avoiding and reducing harm compared to sanctioning. Thus, they rather follow the
"cooperation instead of confrontation" principle and report incidents only infrequently (Schall
1990). Nevertheless, to demonstrate that criminalization can have undesirable eﬀects (which
seems to be understood by regulators) we assume that the regulator follows the advice to report
incidents.
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They are rather in line with the broader framework of criminal sanctions and are
embedded in the system of sanctions for all other possible crimes. Thus, crimi-
nal sanctions are based, for instance, on grounds of marginal deterrence (Stigler
1970, Friedman and Sjostrom 1993, Mookherjee and Png 1994), fairness and jus-
tice (Miceli 1991, Polinsky and Shavell 2000a). Denote the exogenous ﬁnes by fˆ1
and fˆ2 respectively.
5 The only policy variable that remains under the regulator's
control is the inspection frequency, now denoted pˆ. To analyze the regulator's
optimal policy we proceed in the same way as in the previous section.
15.1 Reporting in the presence of the prosecutor
Given the optimal inspection frequency pˆ∗ the ﬁrm will report an accident if and
only if
fˆ1 ≤ pˆ∗r fˆ2.
In that case the ﬁrm's optimization problem is
min
x
x+ σ (x) fˆ1
and the FOC
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
r) fˆ1 = 0
deﬁnes the ﬁrm's optimal choice xˆ∗r = xˆ
∗
r
(
fˆ1
)
with dxˆ
∗
r
dfˆ1
> 0.
As the ﬁrm's reaction function in the presence of the prosecutor and in case
the policy induces reporting does only depend on fˆ1, which is outside the regula-
tor's control, the regulator has no inﬂuence on xˆ∗r. The only policy variable the
regulator sets is the inspection frequency which inﬂuences the ﬁrm's reporting
decision. For the ﬁrm to report an accident the inspection frequency has to be
suﬃciently high, i.e.
pˆ∗r ≥
fˆ1
fˆ2
.
5See also Langpap (2007) who endogenizes regulatory penalties but treats ﬁnes after a citizen
suit to be exogenously set by the court. Given that judges and legislatures can have diﬀering
preferences Miceli (2008) discusses how much discretion judges should be given when deciding
about sentencing.
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Contrary to the previous section where the prosecutor was not involved in the
regulatory process the regulator might now not be able to induce the ﬁrm to
report. Two conditions must be satisﬁed so that there exists a policy that leads
to a report. First, fˆ2 ≥ fˆ1, which we reasonably assume in the following, and,
second, given fˆ2 ≥ fˆ1, the regulatory budget must be high enough to raise the
expected sanction for not reporting above the level of the certain sanction for
reporting, i.e. b
µ
≥ fˆ1
fˆ2
. Stated diﬀerently, for reporting to be feasible fˆ1 must be
small in the sense that b
µ
fˆ2 ≥ fˆ1. Then any inspection frequency pˆ∗r ∈
[
fˆ1
fˆ2
, b
µ
]
lets
the ﬁrm report and w.l.o.g. we set pˆ∗r =
fˆ1
fˆ2
. If instead fˆ1 is large the regulator's
budget constraint hinders the regulator to raise the expected sanction for not
reporting above the certain ﬁne for reporting. In that case a policy inducing
reporting is not feasible if the prosecutor is present.
15.2 Not reporting in the presence of the prose-
cutor
In the presence of the prosecutor the ﬁrm will not report if and only if
fˆ1 > pˆ
∗
nrfˆ2.
The ﬁrm then solves
min
x
x+ σ (x) pˆ∗nrfˆ2
which yields
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
nr) pˆ
∗
nrfˆ2 = 0
and so xˆ∗nr = xˆ
∗
nr
(
pˆ∗nr, fˆ2
)
with dxˆ
∗
nr
dpˆ∗nr
, dxˆ
∗
nr
dfˆ2
> 0. Contrary to the case of reporting
the regulator now can inﬂuence the level of care because this is aﬀected by the
inspection frequency.
The regulator's problem is then
min
pˆnr
σ (xˆ∗nr) [1− (1− δ) pˆnr] d
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s.t.
pˆnrµ ≤ b
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
nr) pˆnrfˆ2 = 0
fˆ1 > pˆnrfˆ2.
The objective requires pˆnr to be as large as possible to maximize the level of care
and to minimize damages not recovered. At the same time pˆnr must be smaller
than fˆ1
fˆ2
to meet the no reporting condition. Two situations are possible: If fˆ1
is large, i.e. if b
µ
fˆ2 < fˆ1, then pˆ
∗
nr =
b
µ
. If instead fˆ1 is small the regulator sets
pˆ∗nr =
fˆ1
fˆ2
−  with  arbitrarily close to zero to meet the no reporting condition.
We summarize the optimal policies that induce reporting and not reporting
respectively in the presence of the prosecutor in
Proposition III.4 In the presence of the prosecutor, then
1. if fˆ1 is large (
b
µ
fˆ2 < fˆ1) there exists no regulatory policy that lets the ﬁrm
report and the optimal policy that lets the ﬁrm not report is pˆ∗nr =
b
µ
;
2. if fˆ1 is small (
b
µ
fˆ2 ≥ fˆ1) the optimal inspection frequency is pˆ∗r = fˆ1fˆ2 to
induce reporting and is pˆ∗nr =
fˆ1
fˆ2
−  with  arbitrarily close to zero to induce
no report.
15.3 Reporting versus no reporting in the pres-
ence of the prosecutor
Having described how to optimally implement reporting or not reporting we now
determine which of the two outcomes the regulator prefers. As the previous
analysis shows two situations are possible. If fˆ1 is large the regulator cannot
make pˆfˆ2 high enough to deter the ﬁrm from not reporting. Thus, the regulator
then has to choose the policy that leads to no reports. If instead fˆ1 is small the
regulator sets pˆ∗r =
fˆ1
fˆ2
to induce a report and pˆ∗nr =
fˆ1
fˆ2
−  else. The respective
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levels of care xˆ∗r and xˆ
∗
nr are given by
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
r) fˆ1 = 0
and
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
nr) pˆ
∗
nrfˆ2 = 0
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
nr)
[
fˆ1
fˆ2
− 
]
fˆ2 = 0
so that because → 0 we get xˆ∗nr → xˆ∗r. The diﬀerence in the regulator's objective
∆ (xˆ∗r, xˆ
∗
nr) is then
∆ (xˆ∗r, xˆ
∗
nr) = σ (xˆ
∗
r) δd− σ (xˆ∗nr) [1− (1− δ) pˆ∗nr] d
xˆ∗nr→xˆ∗r→ σ (xˆ∗r)
{
δ − 1 + (1− δ) fˆ1
fˆ2
}
d
= σ (xˆ∗r) (1− δ)
(
fˆ1
fˆ2
− 1
)
d < 0.
If the prosecutor is involved in the enforcement process the regulator prefers to
induce reporting, if feasible. The reason is the same as before. This gives us
Proposition III.5 In the presence of the prosecutor then
1. if fˆ1 is large the regulator is bound to a policy inducing no reports and
2. if fˆ1 is small prefers the policy that optimally induces the ﬁrm to report.
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16 Desirability of criminalization
In the previous sections we showed that whenever feasible a regulator concerned
about environmental quality prefers policies that let the ﬁrm report an accident.
In this section we compare the outcomes for the regulator if the prosecutor is
present and not present respectively. If regulation is solely delegated to the regu-
lator the outcome depends on the relative size of the feasible maximum (expected)
regulatory ﬁnes, i.e. on whether b
µ
f¯2 ≥ f¯1. In the presence of the prosecutor the
outcome depends on the relative size of the (expected) criminal sanctions, i.e.
on whether b
µ
fˆ2 ≥ fˆ1. Therefore, four situations can occur. The results are
summarized in
Proposition III.6 Criminalizing environmental oﬀences with a prosecutor oper-
ating under the legality principle can lead to lower environmental quality compared
to regulation without the prosecutor
1. if fˆ1 is small and the prosecutor lowers deterrence and
2. if fˆ1 is large and (i) either the prosecutor lowers deterrence or (ii) the eﬀect
of higher deterrence does not oﬀset the loss of certain recovery.
In the following, we consider all cases in more detail.
Small fˆ1, large f¯1 If fˆ1 is small the regulator can induce reporting in the
presence of the prosecutor. If f¯1 is large the policy in the absence of the prosecutor
is
{
p∗r, f
∗
1,r, f
∗
2,r
}
=
{
b
µ
, b
µ
f¯2, f¯2
}
. The levels of care are given by
1 + σx (x
∗
r)
b
µ
f¯2 = 0
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and
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
r) fˆ1 = 0.
Thus, x∗r < xˆ
∗
r if
b
µ
f¯2 < fˆ1 and vice versa. We get
∆ (x∗r, xˆ
∗
r) = σ (x
∗
r) δd− σ (xˆ∗r) δd = {σ (x∗r)− σ (xˆ∗r)} δd.
This is negative if fˆ1 <
b
µ
f¯2 and thus in this case adding the prosecutor leads to
an increase in damages if he lowers deterrence.
Small fˆ1, small f¯1 If instead f¯1 is small the regulator sets
{
p∗r, f
∗
1,r, f
∗
2,r
}
={
b
µ
, f¯1, f¯2
}
in the absence of the prosecutor. Then
1 + σx (x
∗
r) f¯1 = 0
and
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
r) fˆ1 = 0
so that x∗r < xˆ
∗
r if f¯1 < fˆ1. The relative advantage of adding the prosecutor is
then
∆ (x∗r, xˆ
∗
r) = σ (x
∗
r) δd− σ (xˆ∗r) δd = {σ (x∗r)− σ (xˆ∗r)} δd
and ∆ (x∗r, xˆ
∗
r) < 0 if fˆ1 < f¯1.
Large fˆ1, large f¯1 Now, if fˆ1 is large, there exists no feasible inspection fre-
quency pˆ that ensures that the ﬁrm reports an accident in the presence of the
prosecutor. The regulator sets pˆ∗nr =
b
µ
to get a level of care that is as large as
possible. A large f¯1 means that in the absence of the prosecutor the policy is{
p∗r, f
∗
1,r, f
∗
2,r
}
=
{
b
µ
, b
µ
f¯2, f¯2
}
. The respective levels of care are deﬁned by
1 + σx (x
∗
r)
b
µ
f¯2 = 0
and
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
nr)
b
µ
fˆ2 = 0
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so that x∗r < xˆ
∗
nr if f¯2 < fˆ2 and vice versa. The diﬀerence in the regulator's
objective is
∆ (x∗r, xˆ
∗
nr) = σ (x
∗
r) δd− σ (xˆ∗nr)
[
1− (1− δ) b
µ
]
d
=
{
σ (x∗r) δ − σ (xˆ∗nr)
[
1− (1− δ) b
µ
]}
d
If, ﬁrst, the prosecutor lowers deterrence, i.e. f¯2 ≥ fˆ2, and so x∗r > xˆ∗nr this
expression is negative for two reasons. On the one hand, the ﬁrm exerts less care
in the presence of the prosecutor. On the other hand, the ﬁne structure brought
along with the prosecutor renders a policy inducing reporting impossible thus
removing the possiblity of certain recovery. Formally, this is because
∆ (x∗r, xˆ
∗
nr) =
{
σ (x∗r) δ − σ (xˆ∗nr) + σ (xˆ∗nr)
b
µ
− σ (xˆ∗nr)
b
µ
δ
}
d
=
{(
σ (x∗r)− σ (xˆ∗nr)
b
µ
)
δ −
(
1− b
µ
)
σ (xˆ∗nr)
}
d
σ(x∗r)<σ(xˆ∗nr)
<
{(
1− b
µ
)
δσ (xˆ∗nr)−
(
1− b
µ
)
σ (xˆ∗nr)
}
d
= (δ − 1)
(
1− b
µ
)
σ (xˆ∗nr) d < 0
If, second, the prosecutor increases deterrence, i.e. f¯2 < fˆ2, and so x
∗
r < xˆ
∗
nr,
∆ (x∗r, xˆ
∗
nr) can either be negative or positive as then two countervailing eﬀects
are at work. On the one hand, adding the prosecutor is accompanied by more
deterrence leading to a higher level of care. On the other hand, again, a policy
inducing reporting is impossible which means that adding the prosecutor partially
oﬀsets the beneﬁts from certain recovery. Which eﬀect prevails depends on the
precise parameters. Criminalizing environmental oﬀences then leads to more
damages if: (
σ (x∗r)− σ (xˆ∗nr)
b
µ
)
δ <
(
1− b
µ
)
σ (xˆ∗nr)
96
Large fˆ1, small f¯1 Finally, if instead f¯1 is small we get
1 + σx (x
∗
r) f¯1 = 0
and
1 + σx (xˆ
∗
nr)
b
µ
fˆ2 = 0
and so x∗r < xˆ
∗
nr if f¯1 <
b
µ
fˆ2. Then,
∆ (x∗r, xˆ
∗
nr) = σ (x
∗
r) δd− σ (xˆ∗nr)
[
1− (1− δ) b
µ
]
d
=
{
σ (x∗r) δ − σ (xˆ∗nr)
[
1− (1− δ) b
µ
]}
d.
The conclusion here is analog to the case of fˆ1 and f¯1 both being large.
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17 Conclusion to part III
The paper's main ﬁnding as stated in proposition III.6 is that criminalizing en-
vironmental oﬀences can have adverse eﬀects on environmental quality. This can
result even if criminal sanctions are harsher than administrative ﬁnes. The reason
is that imposing criminal sanctions is accompanied with an altered institutional
setting that in many circumstances does not align public procedures and private
incentives. In many countries criminal prosecution follows restrictive rules. One
such rule states that all perpetrators have to be prosecuted (legality principle).
Additionally, the sanctions actually imposed do not necessarily yield proper in-
centives for violators to 'voluntary' report misconducts. Analyzing jointly both
restrictions reveals that establishing an unbalanced environmental criminal code
can be counterproductive.
The mechanism responsible for the paper's reasoning already points to solu-
tions to overcome the shortcomings that might come along with the criminaliza-
tion of environmental oﬀences.1 Three customizations present themselves. The
ﬁrst - and most realistic - is to endow the regulator with discretionary power to
determine the frequency of passing information about violations to the prosecu-
tor. On the one hand, this retains the threat of criminal sanctioning2 and, on the
other hand, it allows the regulator to set a policy that supports self-reporting.
The second is to prescribe sanctions that take into account the incentives for self-
reporting. A third solution sets the regulator's budget suﬃciently high. In case
the criminal sanction for accidents reported is large this can ensure more severe
sanctions for not reporting.
1See also Jost (1997b) who analyzes diﬀerent procedural rules with a special focus on the
possibility of appeals but does not consider self-reporting.
2This threat of criminal prosecution can be important especially in a dynamic setting (see
for example Harrington 1988).
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Taken together we showed that the well-intentioned criminalization of envi-
ronmental oﬀences can lead to unintentioned and undesirable eﬀects. The paper
calls for policy makers to carefully assess the consequences when implementing
criminal proceedings in the context of environmental misconducts and to align
public prosecutions with the incentives of those agents adressed by the law.
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Part IV
Final Conclusions
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This thesis extends the economic literature on monitoring and enforcement by
providing detailed analyses of diﬀerent important aspects of three-party settings.
Parts I and II consider the widely overlooked role of private monitoring. Part
III focuses on some consequences of a regulator and the prosecutor jointly acting
in the monitoring and enforcement process. Thereby, the analyses derive some
important results.
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18 Summary of results
The game-theoretic model in part I focuses on the interaction between regula-
tory rule making and citizen reporting. It shows that simply allowing for citizen
reports does not necessarily improve regulatory outcomes. In a situation with
heterogeneous agents, i.e. for some agents engaging in a socially harmful activ-
ity the private beneﬁts exceed the harm caused whereas for others beneﬁts are
smaller, information provision by citizens has implications for the stage of rule
design. If citizens are willing to incur the costs of reporting only if their action
contributes to enforcement actions a prerequisite for substitution of costly public
monitoring is (a suﬃciently high chance) that the citizen's observation indeed
constitutes a violation. Rules tailored to private beneﬁts yield an outcome where
only agents with high beneﬁts commit an act. This, in turn, implies that citizens
do not report and so their informational advantage cannot be harnessed to save
monitoring costs. The reason is that - without an explicit indicator - citizens can-
not assess what type of agent they face. The resulting informational imperfection
can be overcome, however, by a regulator imposing a uniform rule. Besides a
uniform allowance (naturally accompanied with no monitoring and enforcement),
the regulator can choose a uniform ban with the beneﬁt of saving monitoring
costs due to the deterrence unfold by citizen reporting. Nevertheless, for such a
policy to be eﬀective the regulator has to incur one of two previously not consid-
ered types of cost. The monitoring and enforcement policy will either result in
no agent or only in high type agents committing the act. The former outcome
leads to a loss in high type net beneﬁts whereas the latter implies investigation
costs on high types. The analysis in part I characterizes the circumstances where
a uniform ban leads to beneﬁts compared to tailored rules. Moreover, it is shown
that apparently promising modiﬁcations in (i) the regulator's strategy set of mon-
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itoring and enforcement variables and (ii) the citizens' motivation for reporting
narrow the set of equilibrium outcomes. In the former case all equilibria where
citizen reporting can improve the outcome disappear. Under the latter the two
equilibria that feature reporting and thus investigations matter disappear as well.
Whether the regulator can realize the outcome where he forfeits high type net
beneﬁts depends on the citizen's equilibrium strategy.
Contrary to part I the model in part II takes imperfections in citizen monitor-
ing into account. It shows that increasing citizens' capability to detect violations
is not unambiguously welfare enhancing. In a 'no inspection equilibrium' a better
technology yields the intuitive outcome, i.e. lower harm. However, in the 'full
sampling equilibrium' where a public regulator, a polluter and aﬀected citizens
jointly determine the outcome increasing the citizens' monitoring technology's
accuracy has two eﬀects. On the one hand, there is a greater chance that an
actual pollution event is detected and subsequently investigated, thus leading to
a crowding-in of public enforcement. On the other hand, this allows the regulator
to substitute public monitoring by the increased deterrence of private monitor-
ing. Jointly, these eﬀects can lead to more harm. The reason is that the regulator
only inspects if the chance of ﬁnding pollution is suﬃciently high. Now, keeping
the pollution frequency constant, a better sampling technology lowers exactly
that chance. In equilibrium this has to be oﬀset by a higher pollution frequency.
Whether the resulting savings in public monitoring costs exceed the increase in
harm depends on the parameters. Nevertheless, even if the savings in public
monitoring expenditures outweigh the additional harm those who are supposed
to adopt the superior sampling technology, i.e. the aﬀected citizens, would face
a decrease in their welfare.
The model in part III does not consider private monitoring but modiﬁcations
in public monitoring and enforcement. It analyzes some of the consequences of
separating public monitoring and enforcement. On the one hand, a regulator
still monitors a ﬁrm's environmental performance. On the other hand, a public
prosecutor takes over enforcement. Focusing on the prosecutor's legal framework,
in particular on the legality principle and constrained sanctioning discretion, the
model shows that criminalizing environmental violations can lead to less envi-
ronmental quality. Although in many - but not all - situations the criminal law
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provides harsher sanctions for environmental oﬀences than the administrative law
imposing criminal penalties can worsen the outcome. This result stems from the
fact that it is beneﬁcial that ﬁrms report violations as this allows regulatory au-
thorities to prevent environmental damages by ordering recovery actions. The
constrained sanctioning discretion inherent in the criminal system, however, can
dilute a ﬁrm's incentive to self-report. The analysis shows that it is beneﬁcial to
bring on the criminal law on environmental violators (i) if it does not prevent self-
reporting and increases deterrence or (ii) if the beneﬁts from higher deterrence -
resulting in less damages due to more care excerted by ﬁrms - exceed the increase
in persistent damages due to unreported, undetected and therefore unrecovered
violations.
Taken together, this thesis provides some important insights into the economic
mechanisms of trilateral monitoring and enforcement situations. It acknowledges
the potential for improving on the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of monitoring and
enforcement. At the same time the ﬁndings illustrate that opening the public
monitoring and enforcement process for third parties can have unexpected and
undesirable consequences. Thereby it shows that when evaluating third-party
participation it is important (i) to take a close look at the incentives of all ac-
tors, (ii) to recognize all costs involved, and (iii) to explicitly consider the legal
framework all parties are acting in.
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19 Areas for future research
This thesis provides the potential for further fruitful analyses within the ﬁelds of,
ﬁrst, private monitoring and, second, separated public monitoring and enforce-
ment. From a broader perspective the present thesis is an important step towards
a comprehensive understanding of joint public and private monitoring and en-
forcement. Nevertheless, for such a broad understanding a number of important
questions remain unanswered.
19.1 Private Monitoring, Separated Public Mon-
itoring and Enforcement
Within the ﬁeld of private monitoring especially part II provides scope for inter-
esting theoretical modiﬁcations. One limiting assumption is that the technological
progress of the applied monitoring device does only enhance the monitoring ac-
curacy but does not alter sampling costs. The analysis reveals, however, that
sampling costs enter the equilibrium strategies and the outcomes in an essen-
tial way. Therefore, it would be interesting to see how robust the ﬁndings are
with respect to a technological progress that contemporaneously aﬀects the error
probability and sampling costs. A closely related modiﬁcation would enlarge the
citizen's strategy set. In some circumstances it appears reasonable that the citi-
zen does not only decide whether to sample but also decides how much to spend
on sampling. This would yield a situation where the error probability cannot be
treated to be exogenous but where it is endogenously determined by the citizen.
Finally, part II does not compare the two outcomes that can emerge under a
high and a low error probability respectively. It only considers changes in the
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neighborhood of the established technology. A more detailed analysis will show
whether it is beneﬁcial to invest suﬃcient resources in order to turn a high error
probability into a low one. Empirically it can be tested whether (better) private
monitoring has indeed an impact on public monitoring and public enforcement
behavior. As citizen monitoring initiatives are widespread such an analysis should
be able to exploit variations in time, space and legal or other institutional frame-
works. Finally, experiments will reveal individuals' willingness to pay to acquire
more or better information about others' misconducts.
With respect to the separation of public monitoring and enforcement part III
focusses on the eﬀects of criminalization on environmental quality and a broaden-
ing to a welfare perspective is necessary to theoretically assess whether increasing
the scope of application of the criminal law is indeed beneﬁcial. Empirically it
would be of interest to see whether criminalizing environmental oﬀences has an
impact not only on recorded violations but also on ﬁrms' self-reporting behavior.
19.2 Integration of Public and Private Monitoring
and Enforcement
According to the distinction between monitoring and enforcement activities on
the one hand and public and private parties on the other hand this thesis does not
consider the role of private enforcement. Nevertheless, to get a comprehensive
understanding of an integrated monitoring and enforcement process it is neces-
sary to analyze the relation between private enforcement and the three other
dimensions. Theoretically, future research could analyze how the possibility to
sue violators aﬀects the incentives for - harmed and not harmed - private parties
to carry out monitoring activities. On the one hand, this possibility increases
the value of the data generated so that one could expect more sampling. On the
other hand, however, using sampling data for private enforcement could addition-
ally lead to a crowding-out of public enforcement, thus diluting the incentives for
(harmed) private parties to monitor. Further analysis will reveal the conditions
under which the possibility of suits increases or decreases the scope of private
monitoring.
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From an empirical point of view it would be interesting to see whether and,
if so, to which extent the data generated by private monitoring are not only used
to inform regulators but also serve as evidence in court cases. One conjecture is
that (better) private monitoring should lead to more suits as the informational
disadvantage of non-governmental organizations compared to industry represen-
tatives is narrowed and, therefore, the chance of a successful accusal increases.
Moreover, if these data are used in and accepted by courts future research should
analyze whether this has an impact on polluters' behavior and ultimately on
environmental quality.
Additionally, experiments can provide valuable insights. This holds especially
for the analysis of monitoring by private parties not harmed by others' behavior.
As demonstrated in part I unaﬀected third parties are willing to incur costs to
contribute to the punishment of wrongdoers. With respect to the analysis in part
II it would be interesting to see whether unaﬀected third parties are willing to
incur costs to monitor as well. Moreover, experiments can show how monitoring
costs aﬀect private monitoring and private enforcement decisions, i.e. whether in
practice there is a law of demand in private monitoring and enforcement. Ad-
ditionally, an experimental set up could exogenously vary 'public' monitoring
and enforcement intensities and observe whether individuals monitoring and en-
forcement behavior reacts to these variations, i.e. whether they indeed recognize
potential crowding eﬀects.
Finally, the ﬁeld of private monitoring and enforcement is linked to the recent
trend of regulation through information. Initiatives based on this concept dis-
close regulatory information to a broader audience, e.g. via the internet. In the
context of environmental regulation registers like the U.S. TRI and the European
E-PRTR are prominent examples. As this databases include emissions enacting
such programs has implications for private monitoring as well as enforcement. At
the enforcement stage such data can be valuable inputs for court cases. However,
public data provision can, on the one hand, obviously undermine the incentives
for private monitoring as this might only duplicate data generation. On the other
hand, such data can potentially be complements to the information acquired by
private monitoring. Therefore, a theoretical analysis should uncover and analyze
the channels how public information disclosure aﬀects private monitoring and en-
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forcement and what the net eﬀects on the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of regulation
are. An empirical investigation would ask whether public information disclosure
crowds out private monitoring and enforcement. Similar, experiments will show
how public information disclosure aﬀects citizen reporting, private information
generating activities and private enforcement.
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Part V
Appendix to Part I
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20 Proof of Proposition I.2
Suppose that the citizen plays r = 1 atH0,11 . The regulator then sets ({0, 0, 1, w}L ,
{1, pH , 0, FH}): Low types comply without inspections being necessary for deter-
rence because if they commit the act they get reported and have to pay the ﬁne w
with probability one, thus getting the negative payoﬀ θL−w. High types commit
the act although they get reported because they are not investigated and thus do
not have to pay the ﬁne. The regulator sets qH = 0 to avoid costly investigations.
His payoﬀ is then V = nH (θH − h) which is the highest possible value for V
because only the positive net beneﬁts from high types enter V and neither net
damages, inspection costs nor investigation costs occur. However, given this pol-
icy and agents' choices a strategy with
(
r = 1 if H0,11
)
is not sequential rational
for the citizen as only agents being allowed commit the act and the payoﬀ from
reporting at H0,11 is −cR. Therefore, the citizen's equilibrium play must be r = 0
at H0,11 . But the equilibrium is then as in proposition I.1.
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21 Proof of Proposition I.3
UP yields V as in (I.3). The payoﬀ for the citizen if aˆ = 0 and ai = 1, i.e. if
the game reaches H01 , not only depends on r but also on the agent's type. There-
fore, inspections are necessary for FB: Suppose that in equilibrium the citizen
plays r = 1 at H01 . The regulator sets {0, pL = 0, pH , qL = 1, qH = 0, FL = w,FH}
yielding V = nH (θH − h) as the highest possible V . Then only high types com-
mit the act. Because qH = 0, no sanctions are imposed. (r = 1 if H
0
1 ) is not
sequentially rational and the citizen does not report at H01 . To ensure FB the
regulator sets
{
0, θL
w
, θH
w
, qL, qH , w, w
}
. Thus, V = −nH θHw cIns − nL θLw cIns < 0
and the lemma does not hold. The argument why the citizen plays r = 0 at H01
applies accordingly to H0,11 and H
1,0
1 and a ban has to be enforced (partially)
through inspections. To induce ai = 1 and a−i = 0 the regulator can set TP(
{1, 0, qi, Fi}i ,
{
0, θ−i
w
, q−i, w
}
−i
,
)
or the uniform policy{
0, pi = 0, p−i =
θ−i
w
, qi, q−i, Fi, F−i = w
}
, both yielding V = ni (θi − h)−n−i θ−iw cIns
where the regulator prefers TP. For i = L this is −nH θHw cIns−nL (h− θL) which is
smaller than that of UP. Finally, comparing the outcome from UP nH (θH − h)−
nL (h− θL) with that of TP with aˆL = 0 and aˆH = 1, i.e. nH (θH − h)−nL θLw cIns,
gives the proposition.
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22 Derivation of Figure 4.1
Deﬁne the diﬀerent possible values for c as follows: cFB = nH (θH − h), cUP =
nL (h− θL), cTP = nL θLw cIns, cPBD = nH θLw cInv, and cPBR = nH cRb cInv. These
expressions are set pairwise equal, then solved for nH
nL
and it is stated how the
resulting indiﬀerence functions separate the
(
θL,
nH
nL
)
-space. Then, the relations,
i.e. the intersections or mutual positions, between these functions are derived and
all functions are put into a single graph that captures the respective c in each
area of the
(
θL,
nH
nL
)
-space.
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22.1 The indiﬀerence functions are:
cFB = cUP : nH (θH − h) = nL (h− θL)⇔ nHnL = hθH−h − 1θH−hθL
⇒ left of 'cFB = cUP ' is cFB < cUP and vice versa
cFB = cTP : nH (θH − h) = nL θLw cIns ⇔ nHnL =
cIns
(θH−h)wθL
⇒ left of 'cFB = cTP ' is cFB > cTP
cFB = cPBD : nH (θH − h) = nH θLw cInv ⇔ θH−hcInv w = θL
⇒ left of 'cFB = cPBD' is cFB > cPBD
cFB = cPBR : nH (θH − h) = nH cRb cInv ⇔ θH − h = cRb cInv
⇒ independent of θL, nH and nL
cUP = cTP : nL (h− θL) = nL θLw cIns ⇔ hw+cInsw = θL
⇒ left of 'cUP = cTP ' is cUP > cTP
cUP = cPBD : nL (h− θL) = nH θLw cInv ⇔ wcInv
(
−1 + h 1
θL
)
= nH
nL
⇒ left of 'cUP = cPBD' is cUP > cPBD
cUP = cPBR : nL (h− θL) = nH cRb cInv ⇔ hbcRcInv − bcRcInv θL =
nH
nL
⇒ left of 'cUP = cPBR' is cUP > cPBR
cTP = cPBD : nL
θL
w
cIns = nH
θL
w
cInv ⇔ cInscInv =
nH
nL
⇒ below 'cTP = cPBD' is cTP > cPBD
cTP = cPBR : nL
θL
w
cIns = nH
cR
b
cInv ⇔ cInsbcRcInvwθL =
nH
nL
⇒ left of 'cTP = cPBR' is cTP < cPBR
cPBD = cPBR : nH
θL
w
cInv = nH
cR
b
cInv ⇔ θL = cRb w
⇒ left of 'cPBD = cPBR' is cPBD < cPBR
Left (right) of cPBD = cPBR where cPBD < cPBR (cPBR < cPBD) the minimum
cost criterion c cannot be cPBD (cPBR) because only the higher of cPBD and cPBR
can be c.
22.2 Relations between indiﬀerence functions
cFB = cUP and cFB = cTP :
h
θH−h − 1θH−hθL =
cIns
(θH−h)wθL ⇔
θL =
h
w+cIns
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hcIns
(θH−h)(w+cIns)
cFB = cUP and cFB = cPBD : θL =
θH−h
cInv
w ⇒ nH
nL
= h
θH−h − wcInv
cFB = cUP and cUP = cTP : θL =
h
w+cIns
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hcIns
(θH−h)(w+cIns)
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cFB = cUP and cUP = cPBD :
h
θH−h − 1θH−hθL = wcInv
(
−1 + h 1
θL
)
⇒
θL,1 = h⇒ nHnL = 0 and θL,2 =
θH−h
cInv
w
⇒ nH
nL
= h
θH−h − wcInv
cFB = cUP and cUP = cPBR :
h
θH−h − 1θH−hθL = hbcRcInv − bcRcInv θL
⇒ θL = h⇒ nHnL = 0;
cFB < cPBR ⇔ θH − h < cRb cInv
⇔ 1
θH−h >
b
cRcInv
⇔ h
θH−h >
hb
cRcInv
Therefore, if cFB < cPBR then the slope in absolute terms
of cFB = cUP is larger than that of cUP = cPBR and the
intercept with the nH
nL
-axis of cFB = cUP is larger than
that of cUP = cPBR and vice versa.
cFB = cUP and cTP = cPBD :
h
θH−h − 1θH−hθL =
cIns
cInv
⇔
θL = h− cInscInv (θH − h)⇒
nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
cFB = cUP and cTP = cPBR :
h
θH−h − 1θH−hθL =
bcIns
cRcInvw
θL ⇔
θL =
hcRcInvw
bcIns(θH−h)+cRcInvw ⇒
nH
nL
= hbcIns
bcIns(θH−h)+cRcInvw
cFB = cUP and cPBD = cPBR : θL =
cR
b
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hb−cRw
(θH−h)b
cFB = cTP and cFB = cPBD : θL =
θH−h
cInv
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
cFB = cTP and cUP = cTP : θL =
h
w+cIns
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hcIns
(θH−h)(w+cIns)
cFB = cTP and cUP = cPBD :
cIns
(θH−h)wθL =
w
cInv
(
−1 + h 1
θL
)
⇒
solution is not necessarily a rational expression.
cFB = cTP and cUP = cPBR :
cIns
(θH−h)wθL =
hb
cRcInv
− b
cRcInv
θL ⇔
θL =
hb(θH−h)w
cInscRcInv+b(θH−h)w ⇒
nH
nL
= hbcIns
cInscRcInv+b(θH−h)w
cFB = cTP and cTP = cPBD :
cIns
(θH−h)wθL =
cIns
cInv
⇔
θL =
(θH−h)
cInv
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
cFB = cTP and cTP = cPBR :
cIns
(θH−h)wθL =
cInsb
cRcInvw
θL ⇒ θL = 0⇒ nHnL = 0;
cFB < cPBR ⇔ θH − h < cRb cInv
⇔ 1
θH−h >
b
cRcInv
⇔ cIns
(θH−h)w >
bcIns
cRcInvw
Therefore, if cFB < cPBR then the slope of cFB = cTP
is greater than that of cTP = cPBR and vice versa.
cFB = cTP and cPBD = cPBR : θL =
cR
b
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cInscR
(θH−h)b
cFB = cPBD and cUP = cTP : no intersection because both vertical lines.
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cFB = cPBD and cUP = cPBD : θL =
θh−h
cInv
w ⇒ nH
nL
= h
θH−h − wcInv
cFB = cPBD and cUP = cPBR : θL =
θH−h
cInv
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hbcInv−b(θH−h)w
cRc
2
Inv
cFB = cPBD and cTP = cPBD : θL =
θH−h
cInv
w and nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
cFB = cPBD and cTP = cPBR : θL =
θH−h
cInv
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cInsb(θH−h)
cRc
2
Inv
cFB = cPBD and cPBD = cPBR : no intersection because both vertical lines.
However, if cFB < cPBR then nH (θH − h) < nH cRb cInv
and thus θH−h
cInv
w < cR
b
w. Therefore, if cFB < cPBR
then cFB = cPBD is left of cPBD = cPBR and vice versa.
cUP = cTP and cUP = cPBD : θL =
h
w+cIns
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
cUP = cTP and cUP = cPBR : θL =
h
w+cIns
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hbcIns
cRcInv(w+cIns)
cUP = cTP and cTP = cPBD : θL =
h
w+cIns
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
cUP = cTP and cTP = cPBR : θL =
h
w+cIns
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hbcIns
cRcInv(w+cIns)
cUP = cTP and cPBD = cPBR : no intersection because both vertical lines.
cUP = cPBD and cUP = cPBR :
w
cInv
(
−1 + h
θL
)
= hb
cRcInv
− b
cRcInv
θL ⇒
θL,1 = h⇒ nHnL = 0 and θL,2 =
cR
b
w
⇒ nH
nL
= hb
cRcInv
− w
cInv
cUP = cPBD and cTP = cPBD :
w
cInv
(
−1 + h 1
θL
)
= cIns
cInv
⇔
θL =
h
w+cIns
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
cUP = cPBD and cTP = cPBR :
w
cInv
(
−1 + h
θL
)
= cInsb
cRcInvw
θL ⇒
solution not necessarily rational
cUP = cPBD and cPBD = cPBR : θL =
cR
b
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hb
cRcInv
− w
cInv
cUP = cPBR and cTP = cPBD :
hb
cRcInv
− b
cRcInv
θL =
cIns
cInv
⇔
θL = h− cRcInsb ⇒ nHnL =
cIns
cInv
cUP = cPBR and cTP = cPBR :
hb
cRcInv
− b
cRcInv
θL =
bcIns
cRcInvw
θL ⇔
θL =
h
w+cIns
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hbcIns
cRcInv(w+cIns)
cUP = cPBR and cPBD = cPBR : θL =
cR
b
w ⇒ nH
nL
= hb
cRcInv
− w
cInv
cTP = cPBD and cTP = cPBR :
cInsb
cRcInvw
θL =
cIns
cInv
⇔
θL =
cR
b
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
cTP = cPBD and cPBD = cPBR : θL =
cR
b
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
cTP = cPBR and cPBD = cPBR : θL =
cR
b
w ⇒ nH
nL
= cIns
cInv
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At seven points more than two functions intersect: (i) cFB = cUP , cFB = cTP
and cUP = cTP at
(
hw
w+cIns
, hcIns
(θH−h)(w+cIns)
)
, (ii) cFB = cUP , cFB = cPBD and cUP =
cPBD at
(
θH−h
cInv
w, h
θH−h − wcInv
)
, (iii) cFB = cTP , cFB = cPBD and cTP = cPBD at(
θH−h
cInv
w, cIns
cInv
)
, (iv) cUP = cTP , cUP = cPBD and cTP = cPBD at
(
hw
w+cIns
, cIns
cInv
)
,
(v) cUP = cTP , cUP = cPBR and cTP = cPBR at
(
hw
w+cIns
, hbcIns
cRcInv(w+cIns)
)
, (vi)
cUP = cPBD, cUP = cPBR and cPBD = cPBR at
(
cR
b
w, hb
cRcInv
− w
cInv
)
, and (vii)
cTP = cPBD, cTP = cPBR and cPBD = cPBR at
(
cR
b
w, cIns
cInv
)
.
Because the relation between cFB and cPBR determines the relation between
the two vertical indiﬀerence functions cFB = cPBD and cPBD = cPBR and because
with cUP = cTP there are three vertical indiﬀerence functions six situations are
possible. Figures 22.1, 22.2, and 22.3 put all indiﬀerence functions into a single
graph for the three cases shown in ﬁgure 4.1 where cFB > cPBR which implies
that cFB = cPBD is right of cPBD = cPBR. Additionally ﬁgures 22.1, 22.2, and
22.3 show in which area which equilibrium prevails.
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